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THE RETROGRESSIVE FLAW OF CHAPTER 15 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A LESSON 
FROM MARITIME LAW 
JOHN J. CHUNG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code became law in October 
2005.  It governs transnational bankruptcies and is designed to propel 
bankruptcy law into the new age of global economic activity 
conducted by multinational companies.  According to Chapter 15’s 
supporters, modern day corporations do business throughout the 
world, and debtors and creditors need a structure that can provide 
greater certainty and predictability in the event of bankruptcy by a 
multinational debtor.  At this time, the scope and contours of the new 
law are still untested and unknown.  Its first few years will likely 
generate a struggle between those who have a more traditional view 
of bankruptcy law and those whose goal is to internationalize it, with 
the two sides seeking to narrow or expand the meaning and 
application of Chapter 15.  This struggle will be a continuation of the 
debate between the two competing and polar models of transnational 
bankruptcy law—territorialism and universalism. 
Chapter 15’s proponents designed it with a view to promote 
universalism.  Universalism involves one court in one country taking 
control of a multinational bankruptcy and applying its domestic 
bankruptcy law to all of the debtor’s assets and creditors worldwide.  
Universalism takes the view that in the event of bankruptcy by a 
multinational debtor, the entire bankruptcy proceeding should be 
governed by the court and bankruptcy law of the country that is the 
“center of its [the debtor’s] main interests” (its home country, in 
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other words).  To illustrate, suppose a company owns and operates 
factories in the United States and Germany, and has thousands of 
creditors and employees in both countries.  Suppose further that the 
company was incorporated in Germany, has its headquarters in 
Munich, owns and operates factories in Bavaria, and has half of its 
employees and creditors in Germany.  If this company filed for 
bankruptcy protection, it is almost certain that Germany would be 
deemed to be the center of its main interests.  Consequently, 
application of the pure universalist ideal would result in the German 
court taking control of the case and applying German bankruptcy law 
to the disposition of all of the assets and claims.  Thus, unpaid 
creditors in the United States would be required to seek repayment in 
the German court, and their rights would be determined by German 
bankruptcy law.  This would be the situation even if the American 
creditors had engaged in transactions exclusively within the 
boundaries of the United States. 
The beauty of this system, according to Chapter 15’s supporters, 
is that all parties know in advance which law will apply in the event of 
bankruptcy.  Creditors will be able to enter into transactions with a 
debtor and avoid the uncertainty of conflicting or inconsistent 
bankruptcy laws in various countries.  The supporters assert that the 
new certainty will enhance global economic efficiencies and growth.  
With such goals in mind, Chapter 15’s supporters applaud the 
movement away from a traditional concept of bankruptcy law based 
on territorial sovereignty, and urge the primacy of a global or 
universal approach.  The new law is viewed as proof that bankruptcy 
law is finally catching up to the needs of modern business in an 
increasingly globalized world, and that bankruptcy law will not be left 
behind as international law gains prominence over national concerns.1  
The supporters of Chapter 15 and universalism view these 
developments as a tremendous advance in the area of international 
bankruptcy law. 
This Article takes a different view.  Namely, instead of 
representing an advanced and cutting-edge model of international 
law, universalism actually represents a tremendous step backward.  
Universalism embodies a retrogressive approach to international law 
that has been discredited by two centuries of U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 1. In 1996, the Second Circuit observed: “The management of transnational insolvencies 
is concededly underdeveloped.”  In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 
1996).  The question remains, however, whether the approach championed by the universalists 
is the appropriate way to improve the situation. 
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opinions concerning international commerce.  In short, this Article 
contends that universalism is based on a primitive state of 
international law that ignores a long history of evolution and 
refinement of international commercial law. 
In order to consider, analyze, and understand this view, it is 
necessary to focus on the essential structure of universalism.  Under 
universalism, a corporation takes the bankruptcy laws of its home 
country into every country in which it does business.  The bankruptcy 
laws of its home country displace the bankruptcy laws of all other 
countries.  It carries the metaphorical flag of its home country into 
every country it enters and the law of that flag governs the disposition 
of all claims in the event of bankruptcy. 
The metaphor of the flag is useful because it implicates 
comparisons to what is perhaps the original and quintessential 
international law—maritime law.  A fundamental principle of 
maritime law is that a seagoing vessel is deemed to be part of the 
territory of its home country, and displays its affiliation to its home 
country by flying its flag.  Broadly speaking, the flag has legal 
significance because the law of that flag is the law of the vessel. 
Throughout the history of the United States, foreign flag carriers 
have repeatedly argued in U.S. courts that the law of their country is 
the exclusive determinant of their rights and duties, even when they 
enter U.S. territory, and that they are, therefore, exempt from U.S. 
law.  This view is basically the same as the view of the universalists—
the bankruptcy law of a corporation’s home country should govern 
the treatment of all claims regardless of whether the corporation is 
operating in a different country.  However, the Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the arguments of foreign flag carriers, most 
recently in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., and applied a more 
textured analysis that takes into account the factual setting and 
related public policy concerns. 
The outlook is uncertain, at best, as to whether Chapter 15 will 
actually deliver its promised benefits.  What is certain, however, is 
that many domestic creditors will be materially harmed by the 
application of a foreign bankruptcy law to their claims.  Thus, issues 
will arise as to whether such harmful results are unacceptable.  In 
other words, will there be instances where the application of a foreign 
bankruptcy law violates a deeply-held public policy concern?  Such a 
concern will trigger and require consideration under the public policy 
exception embedded in Chapter 15, which permits a court to refuse to 
take any action if such action would be contrary to public policy.  This 
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statutory exception will play a crucial role in determining the shape of 
the new law.  This Article suggests that one useful tool to assist and 
inform the analysis of these issues is the choice of law test developed 
in the Supreme Court’s maritime cases, known as the Lauritzen-
Romero-Rhoditis test.  The Court employs this test to weigh choice of 
law issues with public policy concerns (as opposed to the one-
dimensional and mechanical “law of the flag” test).  The Lauritzen-
Romero-Rhoditis test benefits from the fact that the courts have had 
decades of experience in applying this test, and it seems that such 
experience should serve as a guide to the development of Chapter 15.  
As bankruptcy judges are called upon to define the scope and 
contours of Chapter 15, it would seem advisable to look to the lessons 
of maritime law. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of Chapter 15.  Part II 
then examines the theoretical roots of Chapter 15 through a 
comparison of territorialism and universalism.  Part III takes a sharp 
turn away from the arguments in support of Chapter 15 by 
highlighting, in a general way, the problems with Chapter 15 and 
universalism.  Part IV proceeds to draw the parallels between 
universalism and maritime law, and presents the analytical foundation 
to support comparisons between the two.  Parts V and VI then 
examine the Supreme Court’s line of relevant maritime cases and 
explain what lessons they hold for transnational bankruptcy law.  The 
result is a proposed test, borrowed from Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis, 
to assist the public policy and choice of law analyses.  The Conclusion 
compares the different processes through which Chapter 15 and the 
maritime cases developed, and argues for reliance on the lessons from 
maritime law. 
I.  A BRIEF SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 152 
Chapter 15 was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 20053 and became 
 
 2. This Part highlights a few of the main features of the new law, especially the features 
that are necessary to understand in relation to the discussion of the maritime law issues.  Parts I, 
II, and III are derived Parts II through V of John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the 
Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89, 
92-110 (2006). 
 3. Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 801, 119 Stat. 23, 134-145 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1532) (West 
Supp. 2006) [hereinafter Act]. 
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effective on October 17, 2005.4  Chapter 15 is entitled “Ancillary and 
Other Cross-Border Cases.”5  It applies to the bankruptcy of an 
American multinational corporation or a foreign multinational 
corporation with assets or operations in the United States.6  It 
excludes from its application all natural persons who have debts 
within the limits that determine eligibility for Chapter 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (small debtors).7 
Section 1501(a) enumerates five objectives: (1) cooperation 
between U.S. courts and foreign courts; (2) “greater legal certainty 
for trade and investment”; (3) “fair and efficient administration of 
cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors, 
and other interested entities, including the debtor”; (4) “protection 
and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets”; and (5) 
“facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby 
protecting investment and preserving employment.”8  Chapter 15 
requires the American courts to “cooperate to the maximum extent 
possible with a foreign court or a foreign representative.”9 
A Chapter 15 case is commenced by an application to the court 
by a foreign representative for “recognition” of a foreign 
proceeding.10  Chapter 15 mostly focuses on what is referred to as a 
 
 4. See id. § 1501. 
 5. The term “ancillary” generally refers to a limited proceeding that is designed to assist a 
foreign proceeding.  Evelyn H. Biery et al., A Look at Transnational Insolvencies and Chapter 
15 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 47 B.C. L. REV. 
23, 31.  “Once an ancillary proceeding is invoked, the domestic court’s primary responsibility is 
to aid the foreign court in administering the debtor’s assets.”  Id. at 31-32.  Parallel proceedings, 
on the other hand, are full proceedings “in each country where the debtor has assets.”  Id. at 32; 
see also Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI 
Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 10-12 (2002).  The use of 
the word “ancillary” in the title of Chapter 15 indicates that purpose of the legislation is to 
promote “a general rule that countries other than the home country of the debtor, where a main 
proceeding would be brought, should usually act through ancillary proceedings in aid of the 
main proceedings, in preference to a system of full bankruptcies in each state where assets are 
found.”  H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 107-08 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 171. 
 6. Jay L. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 715 (2005). 
 7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1501(c)(2) (West Supp. 2006). 
 8. Id. § 1501(a). 
 9. Id. § 1525(a).  “Perhaps the most innovative provision in the chapter is the 
authorization for the courts, as well as a trustee or DIP [debtor in possession], to communicate 
directly with the foreign court and trustee [pursuant to sections 1525 and 1526].”  Westbrook, 
Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 723. 
 10. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1504, 1515(a).  “Foreign proceeding” and “foreign representative” are 
defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(23), (24) (2000). 
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“foreign main proceeding.”11  A “foreign main proceeding” is “a 
foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the 
center of its main interests.”12  It is contemplated that a debtor’s 
center of main interests will, in most instances, be its place of 
incorporation, unless contrary proof is provided.13  The recognition of 
a foreign main proceeding is a key event in a Chapter 15 bankruptcy 
because it may conclusively decide the governing bankruptcy law.  If 
the debtor obtains recognition of a foreign main proceeding, then the 
bankruptcy law of its home country will likely govern the entire case.14  
The effect would be that the bankruptcy law of the debtor’s flag 
would apply to all creditors and assets regardless of their location. 
An order granting recognition of a foreign main proceeding also 
triggers a wide range of powerful provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 
including the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 and the foreign 
representative’s right to operate the American portion of the business 
under 11 U.S.C. § 363.15  A court may dismiss or suspend a domestic 
bankruptcy case if a foreign proceeding has been granted recognition 
under Chapter 15 or the purposes of Chapter 15 “would be best 
served by such dismissal or suspension.”16  In effect, the order 
granting recognition converts these powerful provisions into tools to 
enable the foreign representative to maintain and ensure the primacy 
of the foreign proceeding. 
 
 11. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 717.  Chapter 15 also governs a “foreign 
nonmain proceeding,” see 11 U.S.C.A. § 1517(a)(1), which is defined as “a foreign proceeding, 
other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an 
establishment,” id. § 1502(5).  As one would expect, the recognition of a foreign main 
proceeding triggers more provisions than that of a foreign non-main proceeding.  See id. § 1520. 
 12. Id. § 1502(4).  As discussed later in this section, the phrase “center of its main interests” 
is an example of the almost verbatim adoption of the language of the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, because it is a phrase that is unfamiliar to American jurisprudence.  See infra note 27. 
 13. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 14.  Professor 
Westbrook has likened the “center of its main interests” test to the more familiar “principal 
place of business” test in the United States, and predicts that the Model Law language will be no 
more difficult to apply than the familiar American test.  Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to 
Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2316 (2000). 
 14. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1504, 1515(a), 1520; see also Jay L. Westbrook, Universalism and Choice 
of Law, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 625, 630 (2005) (describing Chapter 15 as being designed to 
apply the bankruptcy law of the center of the debtor’s main interests). 
 15. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1520. 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2000). 
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Chapter 15 applies unless its application would violate public 
policy.17  When the foreign representative applies for recognition, he 
is not required to make a showing that public policy will not be 
violated.18  It is up to an interested party or the court to raise the 
issue.  Thus, bankruptcy judges are at the front line of protecting 
public policy interests, and may be the first line of defense for 
creditors who are too small or disorganized to raise public policy 
objections on their own.19 
The typical and non-controversial case for which Chapter 15 was 
designed probably looks something like the following example: a 
Canadian company with its headquarters in Toronto commences 
bankruptcy proceedings in Canada.  It has a widget-making factory in 
Canada, and one in the United States.  Each of the factories has 
unpaid employees and suppliers.  The American factory secures a 
bank loan from an American lender, and the Canadian factory 
secures a loan from a Canadian bank.  The Canadian representative 
applies for recognition of a foreign main proceeding under Chapter 
15.  The American court grants the application.  All proceedings and 
creditor actions in the United States are stayed, and the Canadian 
representative takes control of all U.S. assets and operates the 
American factory.  The American creditors then pursue their claims 
in the Canadian proceeding.  The Canadian judge has jurisdiction 
over all the assets and creditors, applies Canadian bankruptcy law to 
the entire case, and resolves all claims together. 
The Bankruptcy Code previously addressed international 
bankruptcies in a single section, § 304, which was repealed and 
replaced by Chapter 15.20  Section 304 permitted the filing of ancillary 
cases in U.S. bankruptcy courts by foreign representatives “to protect 
the dignity of concurrently existing foreign proceedings.”21  The 
 
 17. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take 
an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public 
policy of the United States.”). 
 18. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1515-1518. 
 19. In most large bankruptcy cases, there will be a multitude of unsecured creditors whose 
individual claims are so small that it is not economically feasible to fully participate in the 
proceedings.  The unsecured creditors committee may advance such interests, but the 
committee is comprised of large unsecured creditors, see 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1), whose interests 
may or may not perfectly coincide with smaller creditors. 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 304, repealed by § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 146; Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 
supra note 6, at 714.  In contrast to that single section, Chapter 15 contains five subchapters and 
32 sections.  11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1532. 
 21. Biery et al., supra note 5, at 33. 
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purpose of the section was to prevent the “piecemeal distribution of 
assets” in the United States by local creditors.22  While § 304 and 
Chapter 15 may have similar goals, the language of § 304 was 
primarily discretionary, as opposed to the mandatory language of 
many of the provisions of Chapter 15.23  Section 304 did not require 
the courts to grant any particular relief; it merely stated the court 
“may” grant the relief enumerated in the section.24  This discretionary 
language resulted in a wide variety of decisions under the old law—
some maintaining territoriality, and some embracing universalism.25  
According to Professor Westbrook, § 304’s language and prior case 
law “apply only where they enable the court to go beyond Chapter 15 
in cooperating with the foreign court,” but “[p]rior law does not apply 
where it limits relief under Chapter 15.”26 
As with the old § 304, the new Chapter 15 will likely generate 
debate regarding the extent to which it promotes or achieves the 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1508, 517(a)-(c), 1525(a). 
 24. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a), repealed by § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 146.  This is in contrast to the 
language of Chapter 15 which states that “an order recognizing a foreign proceeding shall be 
entered” and a “foreign proceeding shall be recognized” if certain conditions are met.  11 
U.S.C.A. § 1517(a)-(b). 
 25. See generally Biery et al., supra note 5, at 41-48 (and cases discussed therein).  There is 
some debate as to whether § 304 embodied universalism. 
Unable to win adoption of a universalist law or convention, the universalists asserted 
that [§] 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which had been adopted in 1978, was such a 
law.  Section 304 authorized the bankruptcy courts of the United States to turn over 
control of U.S. assets to foreign bankruptcy courts.  But the statute added: “(C) In 
determining whether to grant [such] relief . . . the court shall be guided by what will 
best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent 
with—(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the 
order prescribed by [U.S. bankruptcy law].” 
Read literally, [§] 304 clearly limits authority to surrender U.S. assets to situations in 
which the foreign court will distribute them in substantially the same way a U.S. court 
would.  But the universalists, many of whom were themselves bankruptcy judges, 
chose not to read [§] 304 as written. Instead, they claimed that [section] 304 authorized 
turnover of assets to foreign courts that would distribute the assets substantially 
differently, as long as the foreign country had a bankruptcy law “of the same sort 
generally as [the United States].”  Universalist judges, including Judge Burton R. 
Lifland, began surrendering U.S. assets for distribution by foreign bankruptcy courts, 
and universalist commentators, including Professor Jay L. Westbrook, cheered them 
on.  The effect was to sporadically implement universalism in the United States, at the 
expense of the particular U.S. creditors whose assets were surrendered. 
Lynn M. Lopucki, Global and Out of Control, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 84-85 (2005) (internal 
citations omitted).  Professor Westbrook has characterized Section 304 as “modified 
universalism.”  See Jay L. Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2531, 2533 (1996).  The Second Circuit viewed § 304 as “a step toward the universality 
approach.”  In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 26. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 720. 
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goals of universalism.27  The battleground for this debate will likely be 
§ 1506, the public policy exception.  Because many of the operative 
provisions of Chapter 15 are mandatory, the primary means to avoid 
their application will be to raise and prevail on the threshold issue of 
whether the requested rulings violate public policy.28  The proponents 
of universalism will argue that the public policy exception is designed 
to be an extremely narrow exception to be applied in rare cases.  
They need to advance this position because a broad application of § 
1506 would frustrate the basic purpose of universalism.  Those with 
an opposing view will argue for a wide and liberal application of the 
exception, to the point where it literally becomes the exception that 
swallows the rule. 29  The potential importance of § 1506 makes the 
comparisons to maritime law more compelling because the maritime 
decisions have been driven by considerations of deep public policy 
concerns.30 
 
 27. Its proponents will argue that the origins of the law make clear that universalism is the 
goal.  Chapter 15 explicitly incorporates the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the 
“Model Law”), which was promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) based in Vienna.  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1501(a); H.R. REP. NO. 109-
31(I) (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 105; Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 
6, at 719.  The formal development of the Model Law began in the 1990s when the issue of 
cooperation in international bankruptcies became the subject of a “working group” formed by 
UNCITRAL.  See Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 719.  The efforts of this group 
led to the promulgation of the Model Law at UNCITRAL’s Thirtieth Session on May 30, 1997.  
Biery et al., supra note 5, at 49; Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra 
note 5, at 3.  In December of that year, the U.N. General Assembly approved the Model Law 
through a resolution.  Biery et al., supra note 5, at 49.  The goal of the Model Law’s supporters 
was clear: “The Model Law makes universalism the foundation of the United States’ 
international bankruptcy policy.”  Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 143, 143 (2005).  The lead American participant stated: “The number one reason for 
adopting it was to demonstrate the United States commitment to the Model Law and to 
cooperation and universalism generally, in the hope that our example would encourage other 
countries to follow.”  Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 726. 
 28. For this reason, § 1506 serves a vital systemic function.  The need for discretionary 
flexibility is present in any legal system, and students of legal theory would recognize the 
applicability of Professor Hart’s observations to Chapter 15: “In every legal system a large and 
important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts and other officials in 
rendering initially vague standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or in 
developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative precedents.”  
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136 (2d ed. 1994). 
 29. It should be noted, however, that the legislative history of § 1506 discourages a broad 
interpretation of the statute.  It cautions that the public policy exception has been 
narrowly interpreted on a consistent basis in courts around the world, and that the 
word ”manifestly” in international usage restricts the exception to the most fundamental 
policies of the United States.  H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 109. 
 30. See infra Parts V.A-C. 
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II.  THE THEORETICAL ROOTS OF CHAPTER 15 
A. Territorialism and Universalism 
In order to understand both the context out of which Chapter 15 
arose and its potential consequences, it is necessary to understand the 
two competing and opposite models of international bankruptcy 
jurisdiction that define the debate:  territorialism and universalism.  
The debate over the two models gained increasing momentum during 
the 1990s as international economic activity gained pace. 
Territorialism is simply the traditional practice of nations 
exercising exclusive jurisdiction over assets and parties within their 
borders31: “It is the default rule in every substantive area of law, 
including . . . bankruptcy.”32  It rests upon traditional notions of 
national sovereignty, which means that the law of the sovereign is 
imposed on all people and property within its territorial reach.33  In a 
transnational bankruptcy conducted under the principles of 
territorialism, each country decides under its own laws how the 
debtor’s assets within its territory will be treated in the face of 
creditor claims, without deferring to any foreign proceeding involving 
the same debtor.34 
 
 31. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 2216, 2218 (2000); Frederick Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555, 561 (2001). 
 32. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, supra 
note 31, at 2218.  Territoriality is so embedded in the common understanding of law that its 
daily manifestations probably escape attention.  For example, no citizen of the United States 
who stays within its borders has concerns whether a law passed by the British Parliament will 
affect his or her rights.  To be concerned would be silly because the laws of Great Britain have 
no application in the United States.  That is because, as a general matter, the power of British 
laws is confined to the territory of the United Kingdom and British subjects.  A shift in 
sovereign power is most apparent to those whose daily lives involve the crossing of international 
borders.  For example, the many “frontaliers” who live in “France voisine” and work in the 
Swiss cantons of Geneva and Vaud understand that the laws governing their activities change as 
they cross the border.  However, universalism would subject people to the laws of another 
country even if they never venture outside their own borders. 
 33. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 5.  To its 
detractors, territorialism is referred to perjoratively as the “grab rule” because each nation’s 
courts grab the assets within their jurisdiction for distribution under its own laws.  Andrew T. 
Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179 
(2000); See John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International 
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 944-45 (2005). 
 34. See LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, supra 
note 31, at 2218; Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 31, 
10 (2001). 
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The following is a simple example of the historical application of 
territorialism.  Suppose a business has assets in both the United States 
and the United Kingdom, and files a bankruptcy petition in the 
United States.  The laws of the United States will govern the 
disposition of assets within its territory, but the assets in the United 
Kingdom will not be affected by the filing.  The creditors in the 
United Kingdom may move to seize the assets there notwithstanding 
the bankruptcy filing in America.  In order to protect its assets in the 
United Kingdom, the business will need to commence a separate 
bankruptcy proceeding there that would proceed under United 
Kingdom laws.  Thus, there would be two separate and independent 
proceedings, each applying its own nation’s law. 
Universalism, on the other hand, is based on the concept of “one 
law, one court.”35  It envisions a single bankruptcy proceeding in the 
debtor’s “home country,” where a single court applies the bankruptcy 
law of its country and makes “a unified worldwide distribution to 
creditors through liquidation or reorganization.”36  That court would 
have global jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s assets and creditors, 
wherever located, and displace all the courts and laws of other 
countries.37  Universalism requires a country to defer to a foreign legal 
proceeding, even with respect to property within its own territory and 
legal relationships formed and wholly conducted within its own 
borders.38 
By administering the case in one jurisdiction, universalism avoids 
duplicative proceedings (and therefore duplicative administrative 
costs).  Its underlying theory posits that the overall value of the 
bankrupt estate will be maximized because one forum will be able to 
 
 35. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 34, at 40.  One scholar 
describes universalism in this way: 
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the harmonization of one 
worldwide, substantive law of bankruptcy.  The most common model of universalism, 
however, follows a pluralist route.  Sidestepping the issue of which substantive 
provisions the ideal bankruptcy law would possess, it simply selects from one of the 
pre-existing bankruptcy regimes ex post.  To the extent that other courts are needed 
(to give legal force to the orders of the courts of the governing jurisdiction), such 
courts could convene ancillary proceedings designed to effectuate the controlling 
court’s orders.  The current universalist paradigm thus concedes the divergence of 
present domestic bankruptcy laws and advocates only a pluralist system of choice-of-
law; its theory does not envision (or rely upon) substantive harmonization of 
those bankruptcy laws. 
Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 948 (internal citations omitted). 
 36. Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, supra note 14, at 625-26; Guzman, supra 
note 33, at 2179. 
 37. Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, supra note 31, at 569. 
 38. Id. 
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realize the sum of the parts or the going concern value, as opposed to 
a piecemeal liquidation or treatment.39  Plus, lenders’ costs will 
theoretically be reduced because lenders will know in advance which 
law will both govern repayment and apply to their collateral.40  Thus, 
they are relieved of the burden of risk assessment in the face of 
conflicting legal systems.  Universalism’s benefits can be summed up 
to include: (1) a more efficient allocation of capital; (2) a reduction in 
confusion over competing domestic priority rules; (3) a reduction in 
the lender’s cost of monitoring foreign assets; (4) a reduction in 
administrative costs due to a reduction in the number of proceedings; 
(5) an avoidance of forum shopping and the race to file; (6) facilitated 
reorganizations; (7) an increased reorganization or liquidation value; 
and (8) increased overall clarity and certainty to all parties.41  The 
theory concludes that such reductions in costs and increases in 
efficiency will lead to a reduction in the cost of lending and a 
corresponding reduction in the cost of capital for borrowers.42 
The ultimate benefits are described in the language of economics 
and administration.  What is missing, however, is the language that 
describes the effects in human terms.  The only identifiable people 
who will allegedly benefit seem to be bankers and senior officers of 
multinational borrowers.  The problem is that Chapter 15 applies to 
everyone in the United States, and it is (at best) uncertain how others 
(such as small unsecured creditors, involuntary creditors, and 
employees) would fare under the universalist approach. 
Universalism is also supported by the need for “market 
symmetry” (according to its proponents), which is “the requirement 
 
 39. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, supra note 13, at 2285.  For 
example, suppose a bankrupt company owns an American factory that produces widgets with 
unique specifications for sale in the United States.  It also owns a facility in Mexico that makes 
slight modifications to the American widgets to comply with Mexican requirements.  Suppose 
further that the Mexican facility can only modify widgets with the particular specifications of its 
sister American company.  The universalists would correctly point out that the two facilities 
should be sold or reorganized together because the Mexican facility’s value lies in its ability to 
modify the American widgets.  If sold separately, its value might be limited to the value of its 
real estate and scrap value (with no value assigned to its modification process).  Under 
universalism, the two facilities would be administered together by a single court.  Under a strict 
territorial approach, the two might be administered completely separately by the two different 
courts.  The territorialists will point out, however, that territorialism allows for cooperation 
between the courts to realize the highest value for the assets. 
 40. Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, supra note 25, at 2541. 
 41. Guzman, supra note 33, at 2179; Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 
947. 
 42. Guzman, supra note 33, at 2181. 
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that some systems in a legal regime must be symmetrical with the 
market, covering all or nearly all transactions and stakeholders in that 
market with respect to the legal rights and duties embraced by those 
systems.” 43  In order for bankruptcy law to be effective, it must cover 
the entire market, and this need for market coverage explains why 
bankruptcy law in the United States is federal (in other words, each 
state does not have its own bankruptcy law) and specifically provided 
for in the Constitution.44  Thus, the universalists extrapolate from this 
national example to conclude that in a globalized marketplace, 
bankruptcy law needs to be global.45 
According to one of universalism’s supporters, “the majority 
view, at least among academic circles, is that universalism is 
normatively superior as an efficient and fair model to resolve cross-
border defaults, notwithstanding the ongoing preference for 
territorialism among many country’s [sic] policymakers.”46  With such 
lofty notions to support their position, the supporters of universalism 
belittle its detractors by arguing that the detractors are concerned 
with what the supporters characterize as small and inconsequential 
interests.47  One view seems to assert that universalists just know 
better than others: “Despite the near-unanimous support of the 
academic community, policymakers have chosen not to adopt 
universalism.  Although a number of other arguments have been 
advanced for territorialism, its support leans heavily on a sense 
among judges, legislators, and some academics that territorialism can 
help small, local creditors.”48 
Territorialism and universalism are at opposite ends of the 
spectrum.49  In the course of debate, the pure ideals of the two 
competing models have been softened at the edges to widen their 
appeal and to acknowledge actual practice (to some degree).50  The 
modified versions are known as cooperative territorialism and 
 
 43. Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 13, at 2283. 
 44. See id. at 2286. 
 45. The theoretical support for the assertion that a bankruptcy law should have global 
reach is questionable.  See Chung, supra note 2, at 112-14. 
 46. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 951. 
 47. See Guzman, supra note 33, at 2193. 
 48. Id., at 2184.  Small and inconsequential are in the eyes of the beholder, however. 
 49. There is also another model known as contractualism.  It contemplates that a debtor 
would contractually choose which country’s law to apply with each creditor.  Biery et al., supra 
note 5, at 30-31. 
 50. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 716; Pottow, Procedural 
Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 952-57. 
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modified universalism, which are closer together on the continuum.51  
Cooperative territorialism permits a departure from strict territorial 
sovereignty by encouraging cooperation on an as-needed basis, and 
contemplates the use of international conventions to govern matters 
such as the return of improperly removed assets on the eve of 
bankruptcy.52  The typical scenario would involve each country in 
which the debtor holds assets conducting parallel bankruptcy 
proceedings and cooperating “through the interaction of agents 
appointed by each state to represent the bankruptcy estate located 
there.”53  Modified universalism departs from the pure universalist 
ideal by accepting the right of a country to refuse (under certain 
circumstances) deference to another country’s court.54  Chapter 15 in 
its present form probably represents modified universalism. 
B. Chapter 15 and the Promotion of Universalism 
Pure universalism is the ultimate goal of many of those who 
created the Model Law and promoted Chapter 15.  However, there 
were limits to how much they could accomplish.  Given such limits, 
even its supporters would probably concede that Chapter 15 does not 
impose a pure universalist framework (at least not at this time).  It 
does not commit the United States to a global, substantive 
bankruptcy law because there appears to be sufficient safety valves to 
protect domestic interests.55  In some ways, it looks rather benign, 
with its emphasis on cooperation and communication.56  Nevertheless, 
 
 51. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 716; Pottow, Procedural 
Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 952-57. 
 52. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 954-55. 
 53. Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, supra note 31, at 562. 
 54. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 952.  Professor Pottow observes: 
“Taken to its extreme, then, the discretionary safety valve of modified universalism has the 
potential simply to ‘modify’ universalism back into territorialism, because a state may refuse to 
defer to the controlling state when its laws are different, i.e., when there is a true conflict of 
laws.”  Id. at  954. 
 55. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1506, 1521(b), 1522(a) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring the courts 
to satisfy themselves that interests of creditors are protected before certain actions are taken). 
 56. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501(a), 1525, 1526, 1527.  To the extent that Chapter 15 
concerns itself with cooperation and communication, there is little reason to object to it.  There 
is agreement that cooperation is desirable.  See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in 
International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999).  With 
respect to Chapter 15 in particular, there is merit to formalizing the ability of courts to 
communicate with each other across borders, and to conferring official recognition on the 
person who has authority over an insolvent estate.  By having a formal structure in place, courts 
are assured that they are acting within their authority by communicating with a foreign court 
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Chapter 15 represents a significant step toward the ultimate goal of 
universalism.  This interpretation finds support in the scholarship of 
universalism’s proponents.  The proponents openly acknowledge that 
it was too much of a challenge to move the United States and other 
nations to full universalism.57  The delegates who agreed upon the 
Model Law knew they had to operate within practical constraints.58  
For example, the reason why a model law was generated (rather than 
a treaty, for example) was because it would have been too difficult to 
win acceptance of anything more substantial than a model law.59  This 
also explains why the Model Law does not attempt to substantively 
unify the different bankruptcy laws around the world; there never 
would have been agreement.60 
Appreciating the historical resistance to universalism, its 
proponents set more modest goals for the Model Law.  Thus, the 
purpose of the Model Law is to advance universalism incrementally.61  
It advances universalism by gradually introducing the acceptance of 
outcome differences in transnational insolvencies.  As discussed by 
Professor Pottow,  outcome difference means the possibility that a 
local creditor may end up worse off under the application of a foreign 
bankruptcy law than under her domestic law.62  In other words, the 
goal is to get creditors accustomed to the idea that the bankruptcy law 
of another country may apply to them, and that they may end up 
worse off under the foreign law.  Professor Pottow thus describes the 
Model Law as a device to acclimate creditors to the effects of 
universalism:63  “In summary, while not overtly trumpeting its 
universalist proclivities—and wisely so, given the consensus-dooming 
touchiness of the ongoing debate—the Model Law actually contains 
several provisions, albeit at the margin, which begin to ‘nudge’ states 
 
and that they are dealing with authorized representatives.  Plus, an established statutory 
framework relieves the courts of the need to re-invent the wheel for each new case. 
 57. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 957-63. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Jay L. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 
570 (1996); Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 958-9, 986. 
 60. Biery et al., supra note 5, at 50. 
 61. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 970; Westbrook, Creating 
International Insolvency Law, supra note 59, at 571. 
 62. John A.E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems and 
Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests,” 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1906 (2006). 
 63. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 988-90.  The need for acclimation, 
however, seems to be powerful proof that there is something to be wary of in the first place. 
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along the way to ceding some sovereignty.”64 Thus, states come to 
accept some erosion of regulatory sovereignty.65  Universalism 
remains, however, the “ultimate ideal.”66  On this same theme of 
acclimation, Professor Pottow continued: 
[T]here may be some states that let their guards down because of 
the non-threatening nature of the universalist provisions in the 
[Model] Law—states that may well be surprised to find themselves 
moved slightly more along the universalist continuum and, upon 
realizing that they are where they are, unlikely to move back.67 
One goal, then, is to ease the unsettling effects of transition.  Such a 
goal makes sense in that universalism seeks to alter centuries of 
custom and expectations. 
If there was any question as to whether adoption of the Model 
Law was designed to commit the United States to a universalist 
position, it was clarified by the promulgation of the Principles of 
Cooperation in Transnational Insolvency Cases (the “Principles”) 
among the Members of the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA), adopted by the American Law Institute in 2002 (the “ALI 
Principles”).68  Although the ALI Principles were developed for 
NAFTA, they were also drafted with Chapter 15 in mind, and the 
drafters were of the view that they should be applied generally to all 
transnational bankruptcies (not just those involving NAFTA 
countries).69  Professor Westbrook, a principal drafter of the 
principles, described General Principle V of the Principles as urging 
“that the courts of the NAFTA countries determine distributions 
from a universalist perspective to the maximum extent permitted by 
their respective laws.”70 
Despite the clear aim of the Model Law, it apparently was 
presented to Congress as a benign model of cooperation that was not 
 
 64. Id. at 983. 
 65. Id. at 976.  It is interesting to note that universalism’s proponents have felt the need to 
deny that the universalist aims of the Model were slipped past the Congress in disguise (denying 
the contention that territorialist states were “hoodwinked” into adopting the Model Law).  Id. 
at 991. 
 66. Jay L. Westbrook, Fearful Future Far Off, 33 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Mar. 30, 1999, at 
5 (“The Model Law did not make the terrible changes that [LoPucki] suggests.  He would be 
closer to right if the Model Law really did embody ‘universalism,’ which I regard as our ultimate 
ideal.”). 
 67. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 991. 
 68. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 25, at 87. 
 69. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 714. 
 70. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 35. 
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universalist.71  Only its supporters were permitted to testify before 
Congress.72  The entire process was an exercise in universalism 
“through the back door.”73  Thus, there are two messages concerning 
Chapter 15, and the content of each message depended on the 
audience.  For Congress, the message was: Chapter 15 is about 
cooperation; there is no universalism in the legislation.  For 
internationalists, on the other hand, the message was: Chapter 15 is a 
significant step toward eventual and inevitable universalism.74 
C. The Fundamental Social Policies and Choices Embodied by 
Bankruptcy Law 
A reasonable question at this point is whether any harm (or 
unacceptable harm) results from replacing one country’s bankruptcy 
law with another country’s bankruptcy law through the operation of 
Chapter 15 or the Model Law.  To be sure, some creditors (and 
mostly small ones at that) may become subject to a different payment 
or priority structure, but such a result is negligible compared to the 
global administrative or economic gains (according to the 
universalists).  If the harm is confined to small creditors, and limited 
to whether a creditor receives a distribution of $5,000 or $7,500 (to 
pick two arbitrary amounts), perhaps the tinkering with the 
bankruptcy laws of various countries really does not matter when 
compared to the benefits.  Contrary to what may be popular belief, 
however, bankruptcy law is not just about whether a creditor receives 
fifty or seventy-five cents on the dollar owed. 
Bankruptcy law embodies and reflects each society’s particular 
choices concerning its attitudes toward money, debt, the relationship 
between those with property and those without, employers and labor, 
 
 71. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 27, at 166, n.102 (2005) (citing Westbrook, 
Fearful Future Far Off, supra note 66, at 5). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. It is also possible that universalism’s supporters will argue that Chapter 15 achieves the 
goal of “one court, one law.”  Now that Chapter 15 is law, they may argue that it fully embodies 
universalism and will likely urge the courts to apply Chapter 15 as broadly as possible (to the 
point, for example, where the public policy exception is rarely applied).  This development 
would be like a repeat of the universalists’ arguments after the enactment of § 304.  See supra 
note 24 (describing the arguments to have § 304 interpreted as universalism).  This likely 
scenario underscores the point that the enactment of Chapter 15 does not end the debate, but 
rather gives it more urgency because substantive outcomes will depend on how much of the 
universalist ideal will be read into it. 
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and so on.75  In other words, bankruptcy law reflects and embodies 
deep social issues that define the structure and aspirations of a 
society.  It does matter if one set of bankruptcy laws is replaced by 
another.  Each nation’s bankruptcy laws embody and reflect that 
particular nation’s social and political choices.76  Bankruptcy laws are 
the product of each country’s unique legal, historical, political, and 
cultural context:77  “Given the vast cultural differences around the 
world, and the history of each country’s economy and attitudes about 
money and debt, there is no one-kind-fits-all bankruptcy system for 
either enterprises or individuals.”78 
In other words, bankruptcy laws reflect fundamentally different 
views about each society’s aspirations.  Thus, there are significant 
consequences to substituting one nation’s bankruptcy law for another.  
Whatever it may be, it is certainly not a like-for-like substitution.  As 
Professor Tung stated, “Bankruptcy law’s wholesale purview means 
that recognition of a foreign proceeding effects the wholesale import 
of another state’s regime for deciding sensitive policy issues.  Political 
judgments about local asset disposition and allocation of local losses 
from the foreign firm’s demise are left in the hands of a foreign 
court.”79 
Even a strong supporter of Chapter 15 like Professor Pottow 
recognized this problem, and his observation is equally valid: “When 
one state cedes jurisdiction to another state to facilitate a market-
wide resolution of the default, it must fully subjugate its broad-
 
 75. Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2005). 
 76. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 34, at 48.  Bankruptcy laws 
reflect a nation’s substantive policy decision and are distributive, “deciding which creditors 
warrant special treatment in distribution” and which transfers of assets to specific creditors 
should be set aside to further the greater good of all creditors.  Pottow, Procedural 
Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 941-42. 
 77. Martin, supra note 75, at 4 (presenting a wide-ranging survey and discussion of 
historical and cultural influences in the development of bankruptcy laws in the United States 
and various countries in Europe and Asia). 
 78. Id. at 5.  On the subject of debt forgiveness, for example, which reflects fundamental 
views of commercial and social obligations, “people are less forgiving about debt forgiveness 
than they are in the U.S.  In some parts of the world, not paying debts is the ultimate disgrace.  
In other parts of the world, there simply is no personal bankruptcy system, and little in the way 
of business reorganization either.”  Id. at 35. 
 79. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 34, at 52. 
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reaching, deep-cutting, and policy-rich bankruptcy laws to those of 
the controlling state.”80 
Moreover, there has been widespread recognition of the fact that 
thorny questions lurk in the thickets of universalism and Chapter 15.  
However, in their enthusiasm, the supporters have brushed aside 
attempts to answer such questions.  Professor LoPucki identified 
several of the questions, which remain unanswered: 
Under universalism, the court of the home country would have 
jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case.  But what would be included 
in that jurisdiction?  Could the court void an otherwise valid 
collective bargaining agreement?  Relieve the debtor of the 
burdensome effects of environmental laws?  Suspend the payment 
of pensions to retired workers?  Risk the pension fund in 
a reorganization attempt?81 
The problem, of course, is that when such questions are finally 
addressed, there will undoubtedly be a multitude of creditors who will 
be rudely shocked by the answers and by the fact that such 
unresolved questions were lurking in the first place. 
Given the nature of bankruptcy law, the choice of law issue 
encroaches upon and interferes with the basic framework of social 
and legal values of a country.  Thus, the concerns are not “just” about 
bankruptcy law; the concerns are about a country’s social and legal 
fabric.  In light of these considerations, supporters of universalism 
need to address questions of the following sort: Why should a 
country’s deep social and legal values be subordinated to 
universalism’s claimed benefits of administrative ease or economic 
efficiency (assuming that such benefits exist in the first place)?  How 
does one go about weighing such social and legal values against 
administrative ease or economic efficiency?  Who does the 
weighing?82 
Questions such as these and the nature of bankruptcy law 
reinforce the importance of Chapter 15’s public policy exception.83  
Issues involving labor rights, environmental protection, and 
retirement security are just a few of the issues that will call for a judge 
 
 80. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 951. 
 81. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, supra 
note 31, at 2237. 
 82. It seems fair to pose such questions to the universalists.  After all, they are the ones 
who seek a dramatic reform of the traditional system of territorialism.  As a general matter, 
those who seek to change the status quo should bear the burden of demonstrating that the 
proposed change will be better than the current state. 
 83. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (West Supp. 2006). 
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to decide whether American public policy would be violated.  The 
presence of such issues is precisely the reason why the exception 
exists in the first place. 
III.  THE PROBLEMS WITH CHAPTER 15 AND 
UNIVERSALISM 
The flaws in the theories supporting Chapter 15 and universalism 
have been comprehensively discussed in the scholarship of Professors 
Lynn LoPucki and Fred Tung.84  The problems include: (1) the 
adverse, prejudicial treatment of unsecured creditors, including 
unpaid employees and tort creditors; (2) the incentives for improper 
forum shopping and manipulation of venue; and (3) the general 
absence of support for the assertion that economic benefits will be 
realized.85  The numerous issues are beyond the purpose of this 
Article, but one problematic scenario deserves further discussion 
because it serves to highlight one intended result of Chapter 15 and 
universalism, a result that the experience of maritime law has 
deliberately sought to avoid. 
The following hypothetical is based on Professor LoPucki’s 
discussion of the results of a hypothetical bankruptcy involving the 
automaker, Daimler-Chrysler.86  The hypothetical has been modified 
to reflect a more current and possible development involving another 
automaker and recent news events from Europe—the possible 
bankruptcy of General Motors (GM) and labor unrest in France.87  
General Motors is headquartered in Detroit.88  In Europe, it has 
eleven production and assembly facilities located in eight countries 
and employs around sixty thousand people.89  In France, it employs 
around 1,798 people, including employees at a factory in Strasbourg.90  
Suppose all the countries in the world succumbed to the universalists’ 
vision and adopted the Model Law.  In the event of a bankruptcy 
 
 84. See supra notes 24, 26, 30-31, 34, 56. 
 85. See also Chung, supra note 2, at 110-28. 
 86. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 25, at 93-94. 
 87. See generally Tom Petruno & John O’Dell, If GM Fails, Then What?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
23, 2006, at C1; French Debate Resumes, As Do Protests, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Paris), Apr. 
26, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/25/news/france.php. 
 88. See General Motors, Company Profile, http://www.gm.com/company/corp_info/ 
profiles/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 89. See General Motors Europe, GM in Your Country, http://www.gmeurope.com/country/ 
gm_in_your_country.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 90. General Motors Europe, GM in France, http://www.gmeurope.com/country/gm_ 
france.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
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filing by GM, a universalist would require administration of the case 
in the United States, the home of GM.  The likely result would be the 
administration of the affairs of the French factory, including its 
relationship with its employees and suppliers, in the United States 
with the court applying American bankruptcy law to transactions 
principally and, often times, exclusively among French parties.91  This 
result would represent a complete disregard of the expectations and 
practices of the French parties.  Moreover, the parties would find 
themselves in a distant court, represented by distant counsel, and 
operating in a foreign language. 
In this hypothetical bankruptcy, it is a near certainty that one of 
the goals of a bankrupt GM would be to restructure its relationships 
with and obligations to its employees.92  Given the legal, social, and 
political climate in France when it comes to any issue that threatens 
job security, there is no doubt that the French street and the French 
government would oppose any efforts by GM to engage in Anglo-
Saxon-style downsizing or restructuring.93  The situation would 
undoubtedly create tension between the American and French 
governments, and Americans would rightly question whether 
America’s interests were at stake in an issue involving French jobs. 
Yet, this is precisely the situation envisaged and welcomed by the 
universalists.  They would see value in purely French issues being 
decided in an American court, even where America’s interest is 
minimal.  They would argue that any political tension within France 
or between governments is a negligible price to pay in comparison to 
the benefits of legal predictability, economic efficiency, and the 
 
 91. This result is consistent with the ALI Principles.  See Westbrook, Multinational 
Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that subsidiaries should be allowed to 
file for insolvency in the home country of the parent, and corporate groups should be 
reorganized from a worldwide perspective like a single company). 
 92. This scenario is currently being played out in the bankruptcy case of Delphi 
Corporation, an automotive parts supplier that was once owned by General Motors.  Delphi is 
seeking to reject the collective bargaining agreement with its employees.  See Dina ElBoghdady, 
Delphi to Present Case to Toss UAW Contract, WASH. POST, May 9, 2006, at D1. 
 93. French sensitivity to attempts to weaken or relax labor rights was vividly demonstrated 
by the recent protests against a law designed to remove restrictions on terminating the 
employment of workers under the age of twenty-six.  The purpose of the law was to create more 
flexibility in the youth labor market on the theory that employers would be more inclined to 
hire young workers because the employers would not be committed to a more permanent 
employment relationship.  The law was opposed by more than one million street demonstrators, 
with some of the demonstrators engaging in violence.  The French government responded to the 
protests by withdrawing the law.  See France to Scrap Youth Jobs Law, CNN.COM, Apr. 10, 
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/04/10/france.labor.law/index.html. 
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demonstrated commitment to internationalize legal systems.  One 
court, one law—a model of simplicity and elegance, they would argue. 
Fortunately for those with a more realistic and clear-eyed view of 
international commerce and relations, there is an alternative model of 
law that actually exists and has been time-tested—maritime law.  The 
types of international issues that the UNCITRAL Working Group 
tried to address through abstract debate have been the subjects of 
centuries of maritime trade.  Cases and controversies generated by 
the friction of actual practice and commerce have led to well-
developed law governing and guiding parties who transact outside 
their borders.  Instead of re-inventing the wheel at United Nations-
sponsored discussions, actual solutions forged through centuries of 
experience may already exist in maritime law. 
IV.  PARALLELS BETWEEN  
CHAPTER 15 AND MARITIME LAW 
A bedrock principle of universalism is the notion that a foreign 
corporation brings with it all of its domestic bankruptcy laws in the 
event of bankruptcy.94  Thus, if a German company doing business in 
the United States seeks bankruptcy protection, universalists would 
argue that the bankruptcy laws of Germany should govern the 
treatment of all of its American creditors and assets.  It is as if the 
German company flies the German flag wherever it goes, with 
German law therefore applying to all who do business with it.  This 
concept behind universalism looks much like a primitive form of the 
law of the flag era in maritime law.  It is unknown whether the 
UNCITRAL working group had in mind such maritime law principles 
as they developed the Model Law, or whether the working group 
members were aware of any possible parallels.  Nonetheless, the 
concepts are remarkably similar, or at least similar enough to inquire 
whether maritime law can perhaps add to or guide the development 
and application of Chapter 15.95 
Maritime law refers to “the entire body of law, rules, legal 
concepts and processes that relate to the use of marine resources, 
 
 94. See supra Part I. 
 95. A connection between international bankruptcy theory and maritime law was 
tangentially alluded to in Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 13, at 2316, by a reference 
to flags of convenience in a discussion concerning forum shopping by debtors, and this 
connection was also touched upon in Chung, supra note 2, at 123 n.148. 
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ocean commerce, and navigation.”96  Maritime law arose out of the 
practical needs of the first merchants who set sail from their shores to 
engage in commerce.97  Given its origins and purpose, maritime law is 
inherently international in nature.98  At their roots, maritime law and 
 
 96. 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 2 (4th ed. 2004).  
Although commonly used as synonyms, admiralty law is distinct from maritime law in that 
admiralty law is about the law of ships and shipping.  Id. at 1.  This article refers to maritime law 
because of its wider scope. 
 97. See id. at 2.  A nineteenth-century American scholar described maritime law’s 
relationship to commerce in the following manner: 
Commerce naturally and necessarily followed upon navigation.  To regulate the 
multiform transactions of the former, and to encourage the latter, soon required the 
attention of the early commercial States.  Maritime laws were adopted, appropriate to 
the limited wants of an infant trade, but containing nevertheless the elements of the 
expanded system, that now comprehends the commerce of the world, and prescribes 
the rule of decision, in all contested cases arising out of it. 
HENRY FLANDERS, A TREATISE ON MARITIME LAW 3 (1852).  Professors Gilmore and Black 
wrote, “Maritime law was secreted in the interstices of business practice.  It arose and exists to 
deal with problems that call for legal solution, arising out of the conduct of the sea transport 
industry.”  GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 11 (2d ed. 
1975). 
 98. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 2 (“Although its rules are a part of the internal 
legal order of each country and, consequently, important national differences persist, the 
essential concepts and institutions of maritime law are remarkably similar all over the world.”).  
Indeed, maritime law is one of the earliest forms of international law and may be the 
quintessential international law.  Early forms of maritime law are found in the Code of 
Hammurabi from around 1800 B.C.  Id. at 3 (provisions relating to marine collisions and ship 
leasing).  The Phoenicians, and later the island of Rhodes, dominated maritime activity and law, 
and Rhodes is reputed to have developed the Rhodian Sea Code around 900 B.C. (although 
there is considerable dispute as to whether Rhodes did in fact develop such a code).  Id. at 4; 1 
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 1-5 to -13 (7th ed. 2006).  The imperial Romans adopted and further 
developed the maritime law of the ancient Greeks, and this law became part of the Jus Gentium, 
the law governing all within the Roman empire.  SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 4-7.  
Following the fall of the empire, the Italian city-states (starting around the year A.D. 1000) 
dominated maritime activity in the Mediterranean and further developed the Roman maritime 
law.  Id. at 7; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 97, at 4.  In the latter part of the thirteenth 
century, trade between Aquitaine, England, and Flanders resulted in the Rolls of Oleron, the 
most important and influential of the medieval sea codes, which was derived from Roman and 
Italian sources.  SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 9.  The Rolls became the basis of the common 
maritime law of the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, and also served as the chief early authority 
for the English Admiralty.  Id. at 9-10.  The Maritime Court in Barcelona produced the Libro 
del Consulat del Mar, which was first printed in 1494, and the court provided the model for the 
Admiralty of England.  Id. at 11; BENEDICT, supra at 1-27.  After independence, America’s own 
maritime laws were influenced (but not restricted) by England’s experience, and America 
“received” the traditional body of maritime law (subject, of course, to its particular needs and 
circumstances).  SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 16-18; BENEDICT, supra, at 7-5 to -9; 
GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 7-13 
(1939).  This quick and truncated summary of the lineage of maritime law may interest those 
who enjoy history, but its main purpose is to demonstrate that maritime law has developed over 
a period of time measured in millennia and reflects the practices and legal conclusions of widely 
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the concepts underlying Chapter 15 are concerned with a common 
subject—the promotion and regulation of international commerce. 
Under American law, maritime law is “a body of uniform federal 
law drawing its authority from the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”99  Article III of the Constitution provides that the 
judicial power of the United States shall extend “to all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”100  28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides 
that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil case 
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.101  The federal nature of 
maritime law is an accepted part of admiralty jurisprudence.102 
Some of the foundational issues in the development of maritime 
law were the questions of: (1) Which law applies to a seagoing 
vessel?; (2) Which law governs the rights of crew members (including 
matters of working conditions, health and safety)?; (3) Which law 
regulates the construction and structure of a vessel to ensure 
seaworthiness?; and (4) Which law applies to the commission of a tort 
or crime aboard a vessel?103  Civilized nations agreed that vessels 
could not be laws unto themselves.104  A law had to govern, but which 
 
disparate regions, cultures, and eras.  Unlike Chapter 15, maritime law did not spring forth fully-
formed from a working group, like Athena from the brow of Zeus.  One historian observed: 
If we trace [maritime] law to its source, we shall find that it is not the growth of a single 
generation, nor the product of a single mind, but the accumulated wisdom of 
progressive ages, and different nations.  It is founded on the practices of merchants, 
the principles of Civil Law, approved compilations of maritime rights and usages, such 
as the Laws of Oleron and Wisbury, the writings of eminent jurisconsults, and the 
adjudications of the Admiralty Courts of different countries. 
FLANDERS, supra note 97, at 1.  For this reason, it would seem helpful for any contemporary 
development involving international commercial law to seek at least some guidance from 
maritime principles. 
 99. Romero v. Int’l Term. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 377 n.49 (1959) (citing The Lottawanna, 88 
U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875)). 
 100. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000). 
 102. Romero, 358 U.S. at 378.  However, maritime law is not “a mystic over-law to which 
even the United States must bow. When a case is said to be governed by foreign law or by 
general maritime law that is only a short way of saying that for this purpose the sovereign power 
takes up a rule suggested from without and makes it part of its own rules.”  The Western Maid, 
257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922). 
 103. See FLANDERS, supra note 97, at 38, n.1. 
 104. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 49-50.  Ships must have a nationality: “Ships 
without nationality may be boarded by any state, even on the high seas, and any state may assert 
jurisdiction over a stateless vessel.”  Id.  Moreover, the “flag state is obligated to prescribe and 
enforce laws to protect the passengers and crew aboard a ship flying its flag and to ensure that 
good order is maintained.”  Id.  Thus, the requirement that a ship sail under a particular flag is 
the legal framework that ensures that a ship will be governed by law, and not be a law unto 
itself. 
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one?  The response to this question gave rise to the principle of the 
“law of the flag.”105  In its simplest form, the law of the flag has been 
described as the notion that seagoing vessels are like floating bits of 
territory of the sovereign whose flag it flies, with the law of that 
sovereign governing the vessel and those on board.106  The Supreme 
Court described the principle in the following way: 
Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law 
relevant to our problem is that which gives cardinal importance to 
the law of the flag.  Each state under international law may 
determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant its 
nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for 
it and acquiring authority over it.  Nationality is evidenced to the 
world by the ship’s papers and its flag.  The United States has 
firmly and successfully maintained that the regularity and validity 
of a registration can be questioned only by the registering state. 
This Court has said that the law of the flag supersedes the 
territorial principle, even for purposes of criminal jurisdiction of 
personnel of a merchant ship, because it “is deemed to be a part of 
the territory of that sovereignty [whose flag it flies], and not to lose 
that character when in navigable waters within the territorial limits 
of another sovereignty.”107 
Although the concept may be oversimplified and general, the notion 
that a ship is governed by the law of its flag retains vitality and 
usefulness, and still serves as a starting point for modern cases 
involving conflicts between the laws of one nation and the laws of a 
ship’s flag nation. 
One of the Supreme Court’s earliest rulings involving the law of 
the flag was issued in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.108  That 
case arose out of the disputed ownership of a vessel that was 
anchored in Philadelphia.109  Two “libellants” filed their action against 
the vessel, which they referred to as the Schooner Exchange, and 
alleged that they were its sole owners.110  According to their 
complaint, the vessel was on a voyage to Spain when it was forcibly 
taken by persons acting under the orders of Napoleon, and converted 
 
 105. See Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 176 (1903) (“A ship which bears a nation’s flag is 
to be treated as a part of the territory of that nation.  A ship is a kind of floating island.” 
(quoting Queen v. Anderson, 1 L.R.C.C. 161)). 
 106. See id. 
 107. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1953) (footnotes omitted). 
 108. 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
 109. Id. at 117. 
 110. Id. 
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into a French vessel.111  The vessel was later sailed into the port of 
Philadelphia by the new captain.112  The French government denied 
that the vessel had ever belonged to the libellants.113  Thus, the 
underlying facts of the history of ownership were disputed. 
Nonetheless, it appears there were several undisputed facts that 
were important to the decision.  A vessel called the Balaou sailed into 
Philadelphia flying the French flag.114  It was a public, armed vessel of 
France (a warship, in other words) at the time it was in 
Philadelphia.115  The Balaou’s presence in U.S. waters was lawful, and 
the United States did not object to its presence.116 
Chief Justice Marshall framed the issue as whether “an 
American citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to an armed 
national vessel, found within the waters of the United States.”117  The 
Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the libel action, and held 
that the courts had no jurisdiction to decide a title dispute involving 
the warship of a foreign sovereign.118  With the benefit of hindsight, 
The Schooner Exchange looks like an easy case.  If any vessel is to be 
considered a floating piece of its country’s territory, it would certainly 
be a warship in service of its sovereign.  Imagine America’s response 
if any other country claimed that its laws governed the aircraft carrier, 
the USS John F. Kennedy.  Just mentioning the hypothetical exposes 
its absurdity. 
The Schooner Exchange and the above-quoted language from 
Lauritzen119 could, one imagines, support a colorable argument that 
the law of the flag is or should be the exclusive determinant of the law 
applicable to a vessel.  However, a fair reading of the Supreme 
Court’s maritime cases suggests that The Schooner Exchange may 
have represented the high water mark for the sanctity of the law of 
the flag.  Since 1812, the Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to 
argue that the flag of a foreign vessel exempts it from the application 
of U.S. law.120 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 118. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 135. 
 118. Id. at 147. 
 119. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1953). 
 120. See infra Part V. 
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Yet, the proponents of universalism and Chapter 15 seem to urge 
the primacy of the law of the flag for transnational bankruptcies, and 
it does appear that the law of the flag provides some support for the 
concept that one law (the law of the home country) should apply to 
the bankruptcy of a company.  However, the Supreme Court’s history 
demonstrates that the concept of the law of the flag is nowhere near 
as broad or generous as a reading limited to a few sources might 
suggest.  Indeed, if one accepts the legitimacy of the parallels between 
international bankruptcy theory and maritime law, the maritime cases 
actually raise serious questions and expose serious flaws in the 
underlying foundations of universalism. 
V.  LESSONS FROM MARITIME LAW 
The metaphor of seagoing vessels as little pieces of their 
sovereign’s territory, carrying the law of their sovereign on their 
voyages, is routinely acknowledged in court opinions, but the 
opinions also immediately distance themselves from that metaphor by 
describing it as a discredited or “mischievous fiction.”121  Indeed, the 
history of the law of the flag in America can be described as 
beginning with the simple notion that the law of the flag governs a 
vessel, with almost each subsequent case exposing the unworkable 
simplicity of that concept and then limiting its meaning and 
application.  The following discussion will begin with a review of 
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,122 the most recent, relevant 
Supreme Court case, and then it will jump back in time to the early 
 
 121. The commonly accepted understanding of the “law of the flag” principle was described 
as follows: 
In support of their contention the defendants refer to the statement sometimes made 
that a merchant ship is a part of the territory of the country whose flag she flies.  But 
this, as has been aptly observed, is a figure of speech, a metaphor.  The jurisdiction 
which it is intended to describe arises out of the nationality of the ship, as established 
by her domicile, registry and use of the flag, and partakes more of the characteristics of 
personal than of territorial sovereignty.  It is chiefly applicable to ships on the high 
seas, where there is no territorial sovereign; and as respects ships in foreign territorial 
waters it has little application beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the 
local sovereign. 
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923) (citations omitted).  The Court’s decisions 
have made clear, however, that there are limits to the principle’s usefulness: 
Some authorities reject, as a rather mischievous fiction, the doctrine that a ship is 
constructively a floating part of the flag-state, but apply the law of the flag on the 
pragmatic basis that there must be some law on shipboard, that it cannot change at 
every change of waters, and no experience shows a better rule than that of the state 
that owns her. 
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 585 (footnote omitted). 
 122. 545 U.S. 119 (2005). 
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maritime cases and move forward chronologically to show the 
development of the Court’s jurisprudence over the decades. 
A. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. 
In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,123 the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue whether Title III of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA)124 applied to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. 
waters.  The petitioners were disabled individuals and their 
companions who purchased tickets in 1998 or 1999 for round-trip 
cruises on two ships that departed from Houston.125  The ships were 
operated by Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., a Bermuda corporation 
with its principal place of business in the United States.126  The ships 
at issue flew the flag of the Bahamas.127 
 
 123. Id. at 125. 
 124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).  In a nutshell, Title III of the ADA prohibits 
discrimination against the disabled in the full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations, § 
12182(a), and public transportation services, §12184(a).  The general prohibitions are 
supplemented by various, more specific requirements.  Entities that provide public 
accommodations or public transportation: (1) may not impose “eligibility criteria that . . . tend 
to screen out” disabled individuals, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1); (2) must “make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are 
necessary” to provide disabled individuals full and equal enjoyment, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 
12184(b)(2)(A); (3) must provide “auxiliary aids and services” to disabled individuals, §§ 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12184(b)(2)(B); and (4) must remove architectural and structural barriers, 
or if barrier removal is “not readily achievable,” must ensure equal access for the disabled 
“through alternative methods,” §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), 12184(b)(2)(C).  These specific 
requirements, in turn, are subject to important exceptions and limitations.  Eligibility criteria 
that screen out disabled individuals are permitted when “necessary for the provision” of the 
services or facilities being offered.  §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1).  Policies, practices, and 
procedures need not be modified, and auxiliary aids need not be provided, if doing so would 
“fundamentally alter” the services or accommodations being offered.  §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-
(iii).  Auxiliary aids are also unnecessary when they would “result in an undue burden.”  § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).  The barrier removal and alternative access requirements do not apply 
when these requirements are not “readily achievable.”  §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v).  Additionally, 
Title III does not impose nondiscrimination or accommodation requirements if, as a result, 
disabled individuals would pose “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot 
be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of 
auxiliary aids or services.”  § 12182(b)(3). 
 125. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  It is a common and widespread practice of owners of vessels to operate their vessels 
under the flags of countries to which the operators or vessels have little, if any, substantive 
connection.  As early as 1953, the Supreme Court noted that “it is common knowledge that in 
recent years a practice has grown, particularly among American shipowners, to avoid stringent 
shipping laws by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries.”  Lauritzen, 345 
U.S. at 587.  This practice enables shipowners to register their vessels in countries with favorable 
or lax regulations under so-called flags of convenience, in order to escape the burdens of their 
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The petitioners were plaintiffs in a class action filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.128  Their complaint 
allege[d that] the respondent charged disabled passengers higher 
fares and required disabled passengers to pay special surcharges; 
maintained evacuation programs and equipment in locations not 
accessible to disabled individuals; required disabled individuals, but 
not other passengers, to waive any potential medical liability and to 
travel with a companion; and reserved the right to remove from the 
ship any disabled individual whose presence endangered the 
“comfort” of other passengers.129 
They also “allege[d] more generally that the respondent ‘failed to 
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and procedures’ 
necessary to ensure the petitioners’ full enjoyment of the services 
respondent offered.”130  They further alleged that “most of the cabins 
on the respondent’s cruise ships, including the most attractive cabins 
in the most desirable locations, [were] not accessible to disabled 
passengers,” and “allege[d] that the ships’ coamings—the raised 
 
home countries.  See generally Tony Alderton & Nik Winchester, Regulation, Representation 
and the Flag Market, J. FOR MAR. RES., Sept. 2002, available at http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/ 
server/show/conJmrArticle.53.  In the fifty-plus years since Lauritzen, the practice has grown 
more widespread, and is certainly not limited to American shipowners.  The development of this 
practice was described by Professor Jonathan Gutoff in his amicus brief in support of the 
petitioners in Spector.  Brief for Jonathan Gutoff as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (No. 03-1388) [hereinafter Gutoff 
Brief].  Gutoff states: 
Following the Second World War, United States vessel owners became aware of the 
great cost savings of Panamanian registry as it freed them from United States shipping 
regulations.  Similarly, with encouragement from the State Department the Liberian 
registry was created by American oil companies for their tankers both as a means of 
avoiding United States regulations and a tool for foreign aid. . . . 
In the 1980s a large number of other nations started opening up their registries to the 
owners of vessels from around the world.  Since then the number of open registries and 
vessels flying those registries flags has continued to grow. The nations providing open 
registries gain income from the registration fees and any taxes they may impose.  The 
vessel owners gain freedom from regulation and, very often, taxes from the countries 
in which they are located or where they base their operations.  Vessel owners shop 
around for registries that will provide them with the best possible conditions in terms 
of fees, regulation and access to various markets, and registries compete with each 
other for the business of vessel owners.  Indeed there is a commercial website on which 
subscribers can, with the click of a mouse, comparison shop among various ship 
registries to find the registry best suited, in terms of cost and regulatory environment, 
for a vessel owner. 
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).  Indeed, the practice is so widespread that by 1998, 51.3 percent of 
the world’s total gross tonnage was registered under flags of convenience.  See Alderton & 
Winchester, supra, at 2. 
 128. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126. 
 129. Id. at 133-34 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 134. 
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edges around their doors [made] many areas of the ships inaccessible 
to mobility-impaired passengers who use wheelchairs or scooters.”131 
In response to a motion to dismiss the claims, the district court 
ruled that Title III generally applied to the cruise ships and allowed 
the claims to proceed, except for the claim based on the physical 
barriers, which was dismissed.132  The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part 
and reversed in part.  It held that “general statutes do not apply to 
foreign-flag vessels in United States territory absent a clear statement 
of congressional intent.”133  Because “Title III does not contain a 
specific provision mandating its application to foreign-flag vessels, the 
Court of Appeals sustained the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s dismissal of the 
petitioners’ barrier-removal claims . . . and reversed [the rulings] on 
the remaining Title III claims.”  In other words, the cruise line won at 
this appellate level.134 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.135  The Court’s 
decision was noteworthy, in one respect, because of the splintered 
nature of its ruling.  Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the 
Court, but his opinion is the opinion of the Court only with respect to 
Parts I, II.A.1 and II.B.2, which were joined by four other Justices.136  
The other parts of his opinion were not supported by a majority.137  
The line-up of the votes might seem to suggest wide disagreement, 
and perhaps confusion, over the applicability of the ADA to foreign 
flag carriers.  Remarkably, however, the Court was quite clear on the 
fundamental, first principle.  Six Justices explicitly and flatly rejected 
the argument that foreign flag carriers are beyond the reach of the 
ADA.138 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 127 (majority opinion). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 127-28. 
 135. See id. at 125. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  Justice Scalia dissented from the holding, which was joined by two other Justices.  
Id. at 149 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas joined in part of the dissent.  Id.  However, he 
did not join in Justice Scalia’s broad view that the ADA does not apply.  In his own, separate 
opinion, Justice Thomas wrote: “Title III applies to foreign ships only to the extent to which it 
does not bear on their internal affairs.  I therefore would remand for consideration of those 
Title III claims that do not pertain to the structure of the ship.”  Id. at 149 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Thomas thus shared the views of Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer that the ADA does apply (at least to some extent) to foreign flag carriers.  
See id. 
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted the strong policies underlying 
the ADA, and explored the conflict between its policies and the 
asserted protection of the law of the foreign flag carrier: 
Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience offer public 
accommodations and transportation services to over 7 million 
United States residents annually, departing from and returning to 
ports located in the United States.  Large numbers of disabled 
individuals, many of whom have mobility impairments that make 
other kinds of vacation travel difficult, take advantage of these 
cruises or would like to do so.  To hold there is no Title III 
protection for disabled persons who seek to use the amenities of 
foreign cruise ships would be a harsh and unexpected interpretation 
of a statute designed to provide broad protection for the disabled.  
§12101.  The clear statement rule adopted by the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit, moreover, would imply that other general 
federal statutes—including, for example, Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. §2000a et seq.—would not apply 
aboard foreign cruise ships in United States waters.  A clear 
statement rule with this sweeping application is unlikely to reflect 
congressional intent.139 
There may be a variety of interpretations supported by the Court’s 
various opinions.  However, one point is clear: There are limits to the 
“law of the flag.”  Any force that the doctrine may have must give 
way to more compelling policy considerations.  Given the important 
policies and aims of the ADA, it is not surprising that the Court 
rejected the notion that a foreign flag is a shield against the ADA’s 
requirements.  It is also clear that a majority of the Court was not 
prepared to permit entire sectors and swathes of the U.S. population 
to be removed from the protection of U.S. laws by a choice of flag. 
Imagine if the Court had accepted the Fifth Circuit’s view of the 
law.  A disabled U.S. citizen watches a commercial for a fun-filled 
cruise on her local Houston television channel.  She sees an ad for the 
same cruise in her local newspaper.  Inspired by the promises of the 
cruise ship operator, she purchases a ticket at her local travel agent.  
She boards the ship in Houston, and the ship returns her to Houston.  
The vast majority of the other passengers are also Americans.  
Instead of the vacation of a lifetime, however, the cruise turns out to 
be an ordeal in which her experience is qualitatively inferior and 
deficient due to the restrictions placed on disabled passengers.  It 
turns out that many of the promises contained in the advertising do 
not apply to disabled passengers.  She complains to the cruise ship 
 
 139. Id. at 132 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
01__CHUNG.DOC 10/4/2007  9:50:53 AM 
284 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:253 
operator, but the operator points out that he or she has no legal 
obligation to address or remedy the passenger’s complaints because 
the ship is registered under the flag of Mongolia, which has no law 
comparable to the ADA.  The unhappy passenger files suit in federal 
court, where the district judge dismisses the case and apologetically 
explains that Mongolian law controlled all of her rights and remedies 
when she boarded that ship.140 
Given the alternative scenario to the holding in Spector, it is 
difficult to imagine that the case could have turned out any other 
way.141  Moreover, the holding in Spector is consistent with the 
 
 140. Land-locked Mongolia does, in fact, have a ship registry, with a growing number of 
registrations.  Gutoff Brief, supra note 127, at 5.  This hypothetical assumes, but does not 
represent, that Mongolia lacks an equivalent of the ADA. 
 141. Notwithstanding the seeming inevitability of the ruling, the cruise line had weighty and 
substantive arguments in its favor.  It pointed out that ships sail from country to country, and 
that it would be impractical, indeed impossible, for a ship to comply with conflicting standards 
and regulatory schemes.  To illustrate, one country might require fixed handrails to be one 
hundred centimeters above the floor of the deck, while another might require a height of 120 
centimeters.  One country might require coamings to be on a certain deck or section of the ship, 
while another might not.  Different regulatory schemes might mandate different requirements 
for the height of a coaming above the floor of the deck.  A ship obviously cannot be structurally 
or architecturally altered from port to port.  This reality probably explains why the Spector 
opinions were as splintered as they were.  The Justices took different views as to just how much 
the ADA requires in terms of affecting the operation of a vessel.  See, e.g., Spector, 545 U.S. at 
158 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  There was disagreement over what modifications were “readily 
achievable,” and they noted that some modifications might pose “a significant risk to the health 
or safety of others,” a significant concern when regulating seagoing vessels.  See id. at 158.  
There was also concern that the ADA’s requirements would require a ship owner to violate the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 
1184 U.N.T.S. 2, which is a treaty concerning the safety standards governing the design and 
maintenance of oceangoing ships.  For example, the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) 
Review Advisory Committee—the government body charged with formulating the Title III 
barrier-removal guidelines—promulgated rules requiring at least one accessible means of egress 
to be an elevator, whereas SOLAS, which requires at least two means of escape, does not allow 
elevators to be one of them.  In theory, a vessel could comply with both sets of requirements by 
having an elevator as well as two other means of egress.  However, this problem of overlapping 
requirements was the burden that the cruise line sought to avoid, in addition to the greater 
potential problem that different regulatory requirements would be conflicting as well as 
overlapping.  These issues exposed what was probably the fundamental source of disagreement 
among the Justices.  As framed by Justice Scalia in his dissent, “The plurality correctly 
recognizes that Congress must clearly express its intent to apply its laws to foreign-flag ships 
when those laws interfere with the ship’s internal order.”  Spector, 545 U.S. at 149 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  In other words, the divisive issue was the extent to which the ADA intruded upon a 
vessel’s “internal order.”  Justice Kennedy expressly acknowledged and addressed the issue by 
stating: 
Our cases hold that a clear statement of congressional intent is necessary before a 
general statutory requirement can interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag 
vessel’s internal affairs and operations, as contrasted with statutory requirements that 
concern the security and well-being of United States citizens or territory.  While the 
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Supreme Court’s long line of maritime cases decided over the past 
two centuries.  If the Court had reached the opposite holding, it 
would have represented a drastic departure from the Court’s 
maritime jurisprudence. 
B. Nineteenth-Century Cases 
Brown v. Duchesne142 was an early case, which at first glance 
seemed to be about the primacy of the law of the flag.  However, like 
The Schooner Exchange, the case speaks more to the limits of that 
concept.  The petitioner, Brown, was the owner of the U.S. patent for 
a certain type of improvement in the construction of the gaff for 
sailing vessels.143  Brown brought a patent infringement action against 
the defendant because the improvement was used in the construction 
of the defendant’s vessel (which was harbored in Boston) without 
Brown’s permission.144  The defendant was a citizen of France, who 
was the master of a French schooner.145  The vessel had been built in 
France and was owned by French citizens.146  The improvement at 
issue was placed on the vessel in France, and the defendant argued 
that the improvement had been in common use in French merchant 
vessels “long before the plaintiff obtained his patent.”147  The Court 
framed the issue in the following manner: 
[W]hether any improvement in the construction or equipment of a 
foreign vessel, for which a patent has been obtained in the United 
States, can be used by such vessel within the jurisdiction of the 
United States, while she is temporarily there for the purposes of 
commerce, without the consent of the patentee?148 
The Court ruled in favor of the defendant, stating: 
[T]he rights of property and exclusive use granted to a patentee 
does not extend to a foreign vessel lawfully entering one of our 
 
clear statement rule could limit Title III’s application to foreign-flag cruise ships in 
some instances, when it requires removal of physical barriers, it would appear the rule 
is inapplicable to many other duties Title III might impose. 
Id. at 125 (majority opinion).  Despite the difficulties raised by these issues, the important point 
remains that a majority of the Court rejected the argument that the law of the flag is the starting 
and ending point of the analysis.  See id. at 132 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
 142. 60 U.S. 183 (1856). 
 143. Id. at 193.  A “gaff” is a “spar used in ships to extend the heads of fore-and-aft sails 
which are not set on stays.”  VI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 307 (2d ed. 1989). 
 144. Brown, 60 U.S. at 193. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 193-94. 
 148. Id. at 194. 
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ports; and . . . that the use of such improvement, in the 
construction, fitting out, or equipment of such vessel, while she is 
coming into or going out of a port of the United States, is not an 
infringement of the rights of an American patentee, provided it was 
placed upon her in a foreign port, and authorized by the laws of the 
country to which she belongs.149 
In reaching this holding, the Court noted that the grant of a 
patent is domestic in character and confined within the limits of the 
United States.150  It also observed that the “only advantage which the 
defendant derived from the use of this improvement was on the high 
seas, and in other places out of the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”151  Further, the Court noted: 
But, so far as the mere use is concerned, the vessel could hardly be 
said to use it while she was at anchor in the port, or lay at the wharf.  
It was certainly of no value to her while she was in the harbor; and 
the only use made of it, which can be supposed to interfere with the 
rights of the plaintiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of 
the harbor, when she arrived or was about to depart, and while she 
was within the jurisdiction of the United States.152 
By one interpretation, this case can be read to uphold the law of 
the flag.  However, the case is actually more about the territorial 
limits of patent law.  More importantly, the Court’s decision was 
based on the fact there was little harm in refusing to apply U.S. patent 
protection to the French vessel because there was no material 
commercial impact on or involvement with the United States.153  It 
seems fair to conclude that the patent holder would have prevailed if 
he had been able to show a material commercial impact in the United 
States.  Thus, Brown actually argues against the universalists’ 
assertion that foreign law should govern the bankruptcy of a foreign 
multinational business.  Such a bankruptcy would certainly have a 
material commercial effect on the local market. 
The limits of the law of the flag doctrine were more explicitly 
addressed in a later case, Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail of 
Hudson County, commonly known as Wildenhus’s Case.154  In October 
1886, a Belgian steamship was moored at the dock in Jersey City, 
 
 149. Id. at 198-99. 
 150. Id. at 195. 
 151. Id. at 196. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 120 U.S. 1 (1887). 
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New Jersey.155  Joseph Wildenhus, a Belgian citizen and member of 
the crew, stabbed and killed another crew member who was also a 
Belgian citizen.156  The murder occurred below the deck of the 
steamship, out of the sight and awareness of anyone on land.157  There 
were several eyewitnesses of the crime, all of whom were also 
crewmembers.158  The Jersey City police arrested Wildenhus, charged 
him with a crime under New Jersey law, and held him in the Hudson 
County jail.159  The Belgian consul applied for a writ of habeas corpus, 
seeking the release of Wildenhus so that he could be subjected to 
Belgian law.160 
In deciding the case, the Court considered the meaning of a 
treaty between the United States and Belgium under which each 
nation “granted to the other such local jurisdiction within its own 
dominion as may be necessary to maintain order on board a merchant 
vessel, but has reserved to itself the right to interfere if the disorder 
on board is of a nature to disturb the public tranquillity.”161  Thus, the 
issue before the Court turned on whether the homicide was a 
disturbance of the public peace or “public repose” of the people of 
New Jersey.162  The Court observed that certain kinds of conduct on 
board a vessel would not rise to the level of a disturbance of the 
public peace because the local residents would not be affected by it.163  
It then went on to describe the kind of conduct that would impact the 
local community: 
Not so, however, with crimes which from their gravity awaken a 
public interest as soon as they become known, and especially those 
of a character which every civilized nation considers itself bound to 
provide a severe punishment for when committed within its own 
jurisdiction.  . . . The principle which governs the whole matter is 
this: Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on 
board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the 
home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be 
suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper 
authorities of the local jurisdiction.  It may not be easy at all times 
to determine to which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of 
 
 155. Id. at 2. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 3. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2. 
 161. Id. at 17. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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disorder belongs.  Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending 
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that 
felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction; and that, if 
the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in a regular 
way, the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.  That, 
according to the petition for the habeas corpus, is this case.164 
Thus, the Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s refusal to deliver 
Wildenhus to the Belgian consul.  This was the decision despite the 
fact that the crime was between Belgians on a Belgian flag carrier.165  
The Court rejected the notion that all acts on board the ship were 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of Belgium and that the ship 
constituted Belgian territory for purposes of criminal jurisdiction.166 
This case, like Brown, reinforces the principle that the effect on 
the local setting must be taken into account when considering any 
deference to the law of the foreign flag.167  Indeed, these cases suggest 
that impact on the local setting is the dispositive factor in the analysis.  
In other words, the law of the flag retains vitality up to a point.  
However, the law of a foreign flag must yield to local law when the 
impact on local concerns reaches a certain point. 
C. Twentieth-Century Cases 
In the first years of the twentieth century, the Court considered 
the case of Patterson v. Eudora,168 which involved the application of a 
statute that prohibited the payment of wages in advance to sailors.169  
By its terms, the statute expressly applied to foreign vessels, in 
addition to American vessels.170  The petitioners were sailors on board 
 
 164. Id. at 17-18. 
 165. See id. at 19. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856). 
 168. 190 U.S. 169 (1903). 
 169. The statute was called, “An act to amend the laws relating to American seamen, for the 
protection of such seamen, and to promote commerce.”  Id.  The statute was designed to 
prevent certain unscrupulous practices used to staff ship crews: 
The story of the wrongs done to sailors in the larger ports, not merely of this nation, 
but of the world, is an oft-told tale, and many have been the efforts to protect them 
against such wrongs.  One of the most common means of doing these wrongs is the 
advancement of wages.  Bad men lure them into haunts of vice, advance a little money 
to continue their dissipation, and, having thus acquired a partial control and by liquor 
dulled their faculties, place them on board the vessel just ready to sail and most ready 
to return the advances.  When once on shipboard and the ship at sea the sailor is 
powerless and no relief is availing.  It was in order to stop this evil, to protect the 
sailor, and not to restrict him of his liberty, that this statute was passed. 
Id. at 175. 
 170. Id. at 171. 
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the Eudora, who filed a libel for wages in district court.171  The sailors 
boarded the Eudora in January 1900 in Portland, Maine for a voyage 
to Brazil with a return to the United States or Canada.172  Wages were 
arranged as follows: “At the time of shipment twenty dollars was paid 
on account of each of them and with their consent to the shipping 
agent through whom they were employed.”173  After completion of 
their voyage, the sailors demanded wages for the full term of their 
service notwithstanding the advance payments to the shipping 
agent.174  The defendant understandably objected to payment, and 
argued that the American statute at issue did not apply to the 
Eudora, a foreign vessel.175  The defendant argued that the contract 
with the sailors was a contract to be performed on a British vessel, 
which was British territory, and that British law should apply to the 
sailors’ claims.176  In other words, the defendant argued that the law of 
the flag should apply.  The Court ruled against the defendant and in 
favor of the sailors, stating, “no one within the jurisdiction of the 
United States can escape liability for a violation of those provisions 
on the plea that he is a foreign citizen or an officer of a foreign 
merchant vessel.”177 
The nation’s attempt at prohibition generated another important 
case regarding the law of the flag.  Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon involved 
several steamship companies seeking an injunction against 
application of the National Prohibition Act, which went into effect in 
December 1919.178  In October 1922, the Attorney General issued an 
opinion “to the effect that the National Prohibition Act, construed in 
connection with the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
made it unlawful (a) for any ship, whether domestic or foreign, to 
bring into territorial waters of the United States, or to carry while 
within such waters, intoxicating liquors intended for beverage 
purposes, whether as sea stores or cargo, and (b) for any domestic 
ship even when without those waters to carry such liquors for such 
purposes either as cargo or sea stores.”179  After being advised that the 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. at 173-74. 
 177. Id. at 178. 
 178. 262 U.S. 100, 119 (1923). 
 179. Id. at 120. 
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government would seize their liquor, the plaintiffs sought their 
injunctions.180  Several of the steamship companies were foreign 
companies and operated their vessels under foreign flags.181 
The foreign flag carriers predictably raised the argument that the 
prohibition laws did not apply to them because of the law of the flag, 
and the government argued against that position.182  The Court said, 
“Of course, if it were true that a ship is a part of the territory of the 
country whose flag she carries, the [government’s] contention would 
fail.  But, as that is a fiction, we think the [government’s] contention is 
right.”183  Thus, Cunard represented another decision by the Supreme 
Court limiting the scope of the law of the flag, and upholding the 
application of domestic law to foreign flag carriers (especially 
domestic law advancing strong policy interests).184  Viewed in this 
way, Cunard foreshadowed the Court’s ruling in Spector, and both 
can be read as rejections of attempts to circumvent or undermine 
domestic policy by seeking application of a contrary foreign law. 
The Jones Act later generated an additional set of law of the flag 
cases.  Uravic v. F. Jarka Co. arose out of the death of an employee 
stevedoring in New York harbor.185  Anton Uravic, an American 
citizen, was employed to stevedore by the F. Jarka Co., a Delaware 
 
 180. Id. at 120-21. 
 181. Id. at 119. 
 182. Id. at 123-24. 
 183. Id. at 124. 
 184. Although it was famously abandoned, Prohibition embodied strong public policy 
concerns and goals when it was enacted: 
The Eighteenth Amendment meant a great revolution in the policy of this country, and 
presumably and obviously meant to upset a good many things on as well as off the 
statute book.  It did not confine itself in any meticulous way to the use of intoxicants in 
this country.  It forbade export for beverage purposes elsewhere.  True this 
discouraged production here, but that was forbidden already, and the provision 
applied to liquors already lawfully made.  It is obvious that those whose wishes and 
opinions were embodied in the amendment meant to stop the whole business.  They 
did not want intoxicating liquor in the United States and reasonably may have thought 
that if they let it in some of it was likely to stay.  When, therefore, the amendment 
forbids, not only importation into and exportation from the United States, but 
transportation within it, the natural meaning of the words expresses an altogether 
probable intent.  The Prohibition Act only fortifies in this respect the interpretation of 
the amendment itself.  The manufacture, possession, sale and transportation of spirits 
and wine for other than beverage purposes are provided for in the act, but there is no 
provision for transshipment or carriage across the country from without. 
Id. at 130-31 (quoting Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 259 U.S. 80, 89 (1922)) (citation 
omitted).  Whether or not Prohibition was ill-advised is immaterial to this analysis.  The crucial 
point is that the Court refused to allow strong public policy goals to be undermined by the 
application of a law of a foreign flag. 
 185. 282 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1931).  “Stevedore” means “[t]o load or unload cargo of (a ship).”  
XVI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 661 (2d ed. 1989). 
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corporation.186  In July 1926, Mr. Uravic was on a vessel flying the 
German flag, helping to unload it.187  He suffered an injury while on 
board, and died as a result.188  The issue before the Court was whether 
the Jones Act applied to his death.189  The issue was important 
because application of the Jones Act barred certain defenses of the 
employer regarding its liability for the death.190 
The defendant urged the Court to view Mr. Uravic in the same 
manner as a hypothetical German seaman who might have suffered 
fatal injuries on board the German ship.191  Under such circumstances, 
the Jones Act would not apply, and the defendant argued the same 
result should govern the suit arising out of Mr. Uravic’s death.192  In 
short, the defendant argued that the Jones Act should not apply to an 
American employed to stevedore who suffered fatal injuries while on 
board a German ship, and that the law of the flag (German law) 
should apply instead.193 
The Court rejected the argument that an American employed to 
stevedore should lose the protection of American law because of the 
happenstance that he was injured while on board a German vessel.194  
In the decision, Justice Holmes flatly dismissed the possibility that 
German law might control,195 and stated, “There is strong reason for 
giving the same protection to the person of those who work in our 
harbors when they are working upon a German ship that they would 
 
 186. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 237-38. 
 187. Id. at 238. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 237.  The Jones Act governs (among other things) the liability of vessel operators 
and marine employers for the work-related injury or death of an employee seaman.  46 U.S.C. § 
688(a) (2000) provides: 
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at 
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and 
in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law 
right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in 
case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal 
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the 
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or 
regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be 
applicable.  Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which 
the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located. 
§ 688(a). 
 190. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 238. 
 191. See id. at 240. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. at 239. 
 195. Id. at 240. 
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receive when working upon an American ship in the next 
dock . . . .”196  He went on to say: 
It always is the law of the United States that governs within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, even when for some special 
occasion this country adopts a foreign law as its own.  There hardly 
seems to be a reason why it should adopt a different rule for people 
subject to its authority because they are upon a private vessel 
registered abroad.197 
Another important case in this area was Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. 
Rhoditis, which also involved the application of the Jones Act.198  The 
respondent, Rhoditis, was a Greek seaman on board the Hellenic 
Hero, a vessel registered under the Greek flag and operated by the 
petitioner, a Greek corporation.199  Rhoditis’s employment contract 
provided that Greek law governed, and required all claims arising out 
of the contract to be adjudicated in a Greek court.200  Rhoditis was 
injured while the Hellenic Hero was docked in New Orleans, and 
sought compensation under the Jones Act in U.S. district court.201  
The district court found in his favor, and the decision was affirmed by 
the circuit court.202  The petitioner appealed, arguing that the Jones 
Act did not apply to a situation that was so dominated by its 
connection to Greece and Greek law.203 
While acknowledging the strong connections to Greece,204 the 
Court noted the following connections to the United States.  
Although the petitioner was a Greek company, its largest office was 
in New York and it also had an office in New Orleans.205  More than 
ninety-five percent of its stock was owned by a Greek citizen who 
lived in Connecticut, and had lived in the United States since 1945.206  
Additionally, the Hellenic Hero was “engaged in regularly scheduled 
runs between various ports of the United States and the Middle East, 
 
 196. Id. at 238. 
 197. Id. at 240 (citations omitted). 
 198. 398 U.S. 306, 307 (1970). 
 199. Id. at 307-08. 
 200. Id. at 308. 
 201. Id. at 307. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 308. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 307. 
 206. Id. at 307-08. 
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Pakistan, and India,” and “its entire income [was] from cargo either 
originating or terminating in the United States.”207 
After weighing the various connections to Greece and the 
United States, the Court held that U.S. law applied to Rhoditis’s 
claim, stating: 
We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained 
construction so that this alien owner, engaged in an extensive 
business operation in this country, may have an advantage over 
citizens engaged in the same business by allowing him to escape the 
obligations and responsibility of a Jones Act “employer.”  The flag, 
the nationality of the seaman, the fact that his employment contract 
was Greek, and that he might be compensated there are in the 
totality of the circumstances of this case minor weights in the scales 
compared with the substantial and continuing contacts that this 
alien owner has with this country.  If, as stated in Bartholomew v. 
Universe Tankships Inc., 263 F.2d 437, the liberal purposes of the 
Jones Act are to be effectuated, the facade of the operation must 
be considered as minor, compared with the real nature of the 
operation and a cold objective look at the actual operational 
contacts that this ship and this owner have with the United States. 
By that test the Court of Appeals was clearly right in holding that 
petitioner Hellenic Lines was an “employer” under the Jones 
Act.208 
If nothing else, Rhoditis demonstrates that the Court refuses to 
engage in mechanical or bright-line tests based on such simple 
measures as the law of the flag in determining the applicability of 
American law to foreign flag carriers.  The Court could have limited 
its analysis to asking which flag flew over the Hellenic Hero.  Instead, 
the Court chose to engage in a more textured, and difficult, analysis 
to resolve the issue. 
D. Summary 
This line of cases shows that the Supreme Court has consistently 
and repeatedly rejected the argument that the law of a foreign flag 
controls and determines all activities and issues relating to a vessel.209  
Moreover, the present Court shows no inclination to restore strength 
to the law of the flag principle.210  Spector presented an opportunity 
for the Court to protect a foreign flag carrier, but a clear majority of 
the Court refused to permit a foreign flag to serve as a shield against 
 
 207. Id. at 308. 
 208. Id. at 310. 
 209. See supra Parts V.A-C. 
 210. See generally Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005). 
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the application of American law.211  Schooner Exchange recognized 
the basic concept of the law of the flag, but the subsequent cases have 
narrowed and limited that general principle to the point where the 
“mischievous fiction” of the law of the flag has been drained of 
almost all force when used in attempts to avoid American 
requirements.212  The attempt by the universalists to assert the law of a 
foreign flag over bankruptcies in this country (or any other) runs 
counter to the clear and long-established line of cases rejecting the 
notion that a foreign flag controls all issues and disputes. 
In order for universalism to work, the law must disregard local 
concerns.  After all, the fundamental premise of universalism is that 
local concerns and local laws must yield to a universally applied law 
(the law of the debtor’s home country).  If one supports the 
universalist position, then one must necessarily argue that the 
Supreme Court has been wrong for over 150 years because the Court 
has consistently and repeatedly rejected the argument that the law of 
the flag trumps local concerns and local laws.  The universalists may 
argue that we live in a new era in which everything is different and 
the old rules do not apply (history will determine whether that is true 
or not).  If it is the case that this is a new era, however, it seems 
reasonable to require the universalists to demonstrate compelling 
reasons why this long line of decisions should be neglected. 
VI.  MARITIME LAW’S  
TREATMENT OF THE APPLICABLE LAW 
The history of maritime law demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly refused to apply a mechanical, one-dimensional 
test based on the law of the flag to determine applicable law.  In place 
of such a test, Lauritzen v. Larsen presented a multi-factor analysis to 
decide the issue.213  The seven factors were: (1) place of the wrongful 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. See generally Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
 213. 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953).  Lauritzen involved a maritime tort (the facts of which are 
discussed below).  However, its multi-factor analysis is not limited to such torts.  In Romero v. 
International Terminal Operating Co., the Court decided that all claims arising under the 
general maritime law should be subject to the Lauritzen analysis.  358 U.S. 354, 382 (1959).  In 
other words, Romero makes clear that even though Lauritzen arose out of the Jones Act, its 
analysis applies to maritime law in general: 
While Lauritzen v. Larsen involved claims asserted under the Jones Act, the principles 
on which it was decided did not derive from the terms of that statute.  We pointed out 
that the Jones Act had been written “not on a clean slate, but as a postscript to a long 
series of enactments governing shipping.  All were enacted with regard to a seasoned 
body of maritime law developed by the experience of American courts long 
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act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) 
allegiance of the defendant ship owner; (5) place of contract; (6) 
inaccessibility of the foreign forum; and (7) the law of the forum.214 
This analysis arose out of the following facts.  Larsen was a 
Danish seaman who was temporarily in New York, where he: 
joined the crew of the Randa, a ship of Danish flag and registry, 
owned by petitioner, a Danish citizen.  Larsen signed ship’s articles, 
written in Danish, providing that the rights of crew members would 
be governed by Danish law and by the employer’s contract with the 
Danish Seamen’s Union, of which Larsen was a member.  He 
was . . . injured aboard the Randa in the course of employment, 
while it was in Havana harbor.215 
Larsen filed an action in federal court in New York under the Jones 
Act, and recovered damages for his injury.216  The defendant 
appealed, arguing that Danish law controlled and that Larsen was not 
entitled to his award under Danish law.217  The Second Circuit 
affirmed the award of damages.218 
The Supreme Court reversed.219  It highlighted the basic facts, 
which pointed to Denmark as the country to provide the governing 
law, stating: 
This review of the connecting factors which either maritime law or 
our municipal law of conflicts regards as significant in determining 
the law applicable to a claim of actionable wrong shows an 
overwhelming preponderance in favor of Danish law.  The parties 
are both Danish subjects, the events took place on a Danish ship, 
not within our territorial waters.  Against these considerations is 
only the fact that the defendant was served here with process and 
that the plaintiff signed on in New York, where the defendant was 
 
accustomed to dealing with admiralty problems in reconciling our own with foreign 
interests and in accommodating the reach of our own laws to those of other maritime 
nations.”  345 U.S., at 577.  Thus the Jones Act was applied “to foreign events, foreign 
ships and foreign seamen only in accordance with the usual doctrine and practices of 
maritime law.”  345 U.S., at 581.  The broad principles of choice of law and the 
applicable criteria of selection set forth in Lauritzen were intended to guide courts in 
the application of maritime law generally.  Of course, due regard must be had for the 
differing interests advanced by varied aspects of maritime law.  But the similarity in 
purpose and function of the Jones Act and the general maritime principles of 
compensation for personal injury, admit of no rational differentiation of treatment for 
choice of law purposes.  Thus the reasoning of Lauritzen v. Larsen governs all claims 
here. 
Romero, 358 U.S. at 382. 
 214. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-91. 
 215. Id. at 573. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 593. 
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engaged in our foreign commerce.  The latter event is offset by 
provision of his contract that the law of Denmark should govern.220 
The Court later added to this analysis in Rhoditis, in which the 
Court cautioned that the factors listed in Lauritzen were not meant to 
be applied mechanically and were not exclusive.221  The Court also 
added a ship’s base of operations as another factor to be considered:222  
“Accordingly, under the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy there are 
at least eight factors to be considered in determining whether foreign 
or domestic law will apply in an action within the admiralty 
jurisdiction.  The flag of the vessel involved is only one.”223  Thus, the 
proper application of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis factors depends 
on a case-by-case analysis, and exclusive reliance on a vessel’s flag, 
without any consideration of the other factors, is contrary to the 
proper analysis the Court has established for maritime cases.224 
 
 220. Id. at 592. 
 221. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1970). 
 222. See id. at 309. 
 223. Gutoff Brief, supra note 127, at 21.  The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis test is also 
compatible with the approach of § 403 of the Restatement (Third), of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States, which addresses the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign persons and 
activities.  Under § 403(2), factors to consider before exercising jurisdiction include: 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to 
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and 
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the 
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, 
or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the 
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the 
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic 
system; 
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the 
international system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; 
and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2) 
(1987). 
 224. Gutoff Brief, supra note 127, at 21-22.  At least one court has recognized the general 
applicability of Lauritzen and Romero to international bankruptcy.  See In re Maxwell 
Commc’ns Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).  In re Maxwell arose out of the collapse of a 
media empire called Maxwell Communication, which spawned bankruptcy proceedings in the 
United States and England.  One issue in the case was which law and which court would govern 
and decide an issue concerning the avoidance of certain pre-petition transfers.  The court 
ultimately decided to defer to the laws and courts of England.  In doing so, the Second Circuit 
cited several choice of law cases, including Lauritzen and Romero.  Id. at 1047-48. This article 
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A. A Suggested Application of a Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis Type 
of Test to Chapter 15 
If one accepts the view that the maritime analysis is analogous 
enough to Chapter 15, questions naturally arise as to how and when 
such an analysis could be applied to a Chapter 15 case.  Does the 
statutory framework of Chapter 15 even allow for the use of a 
Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test?  If the answer is yes, under 
what circumstances would such a test apply to a Chapter 15 case? 
A natural opening for application of such a test is found in § 
1506, the public policy exception.225  Section 1506 answers those who 
assert that Congress spoke on the choice of law issue by enacting 
Chapter 15.  Some might argue that the choice of law issue has been 
resolved because §§ 1501(a) and 1525(a), along with the mandatory 
language of the other sections and the legislative history, express the 
view of Congress that the law of a debtor’s center of main interests 
shall control.  This argument would go on to assert that the choice of 
law is not a matter that has been left open for the courts.  If this 
argument is correct, then any comparisons to maritime law or any 
other law would be pointless because the analysis of any choice of law 
issue would be strictly confined to the statutory language. 
However, choice of law is not a closed issue governed by 
dispositive statutory language because § 1506 is a safety valve that 
was deliberately inserted by Congress into Chapter 15 to prevent 
mechanical applications of foreign law.  Despite the repeated 
expressions of support for global cooperation and harmony, Congress 
was concerned about how the application of foreign law might affect 
domestic parties and interests, and wanted to ensure that there would 
be a mechanism to prevent unacceptable harm.  Thus, § 1506 leaves 
wide open the issue of the choice of law when public policy concerns 
are at stake, and nothing in the statute prevents the courts from 
looking to other relevant sources for guidance in deciding a choice of 
law issue.  A Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test could provide a 
useful guide by which to weigh a public policy challenge.  This point 
can be illustrated by the use of a hypothetical involving a Chinese oil 
company with operations in the United States:226 
 
takes the court’s discussion a step further by placing the comparison in the context of the “law 
of the flag” analysis. 
 225. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (West Supp. 2006). 
 226. This hypothetical was presented in Chung, supra note 2, at 116, in order to demonstrate 
the prejudicial effect of Chapter 15 on tort claimants.  It was based on an actual failed attempt 
by a Chinese oil company to acquire Unocal, an American oil company. 
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Suppose a Chinese company owns a refinery and several producing 
oil wells in the United States.  Due to an incident at the refinery, 
thousands of residents in the surrounding area are seriously injured.  
Their claims threaten to overwhelm the company, and its lenders 
and suppliers become nervous about doing business with it.  
However, the producing oil wells generate sufficient revenue to 
cover most of the claims.  Under the historical, territorialist system, 
the company would commence a bankruptcy action in the United 
States, and a resolution would likely be reached where the claims 
would be satisfied out of the present and future revenues of the 
producing wells. 
Under universalism and Chapter 15, on the other hand, the 
company could file bankruptcy in China (which would be the 
foreign main proceeding).  An order granting recognition in the 
U.S. would automatically stay the victims’ claims in the United 
States.  Furthermore, the tort victims would not be eligible to file 
an involuntary petition in the United States . . . .227 
Under Chapter 15, it is possible that the tort victims would be forced 
to go to China and “seek justice in a Chinese court applying Chinese 
law.”228 
Most would probably agree that this would never happen in real 
life because no American judge would allow that result and would 
certainly invoke § 1506, the public policy exception.  Yet what would 
justify the invocation of § 1506, other than a visceral reaction?  What 
is the analytical framework that would lead to the conclusion that 
forcing the tort victims into the Chinese legal system would violate 
U.S. public policy?  This would seem like an appropriate situation for 
a Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test. 
Under such a test, the following factors would point to the 
United States as the proper forum:  (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) 
allegiance or domicile of the injured; (3) inaccessibility of the foreign 
forum;229 and (4) base of relevant commercial operations.  The factors 
 
 227. Id.  See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (West 2006).  Under this statute, an involuntary case 
may only be filed by a holder of a claim “that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a 
bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.”  Id.  This language excludes the tort claimants in the 
hypothetical. 
 228. Chung, supra note 2, at 116. 
 229. A separate or related factor could ask whether the foreign forum is governed by the 
rule of law, affords adequate due process, and is free of corruption.  Most would probably agree 
that public policy would be violated if these considerations were absent in a foreign forum.  
However, there are more difficult issues.  Does the foreign forum provide procedural vehicles 
that are available in the United States?  For example, could the tort victims assert their claims as 
part of a group or class, or would they be forced to bring individual proceedings?  If they are 
forced to bring individual claims, does this violate American public policy?  What if the foreign 
forum does not recognize theories of recovery or remedies available in the United States?  
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pointing to China as the proper forum would include law of the flag 
(home country) and allegiance of the defendant.  It seems fair to 
conclude that most observers would agree that the factors 
overwhelmingly point to the United States as the proper forum. 
For contractual relationships, the “place of contract” factor could 
perhaps be refined to add additional factors such as the place where 
the contract was made, the place where the contract was to be 
performed, the extent to which the debtor or creditor made offers or 
solicited acceptances in a country (for example, Norwegian Cruise 
Line advertising in the United States), and the extent to which the 
debtor or creditor sought or derived commercial benefits in the 
foreign forum.  Two hypotheticals illustrate how these factors might 
operate. 
Hypothetical 1:  Suppose there is a Chinese manufacturer of 
widgets.  A large American bank seeks to gain entry into the 
commercial lending market in China.  It contacts the Chief Financial 
Officer of the company and offers extremely attractive terms that are 
designed to establish the bank’s presence in China.  The company 
accepts the terms of the loan, and a line of credit is established, with 
the borrowed amounts secured by assets in China and the United 
States.  The bank sends senior officers and its outside lawyers to close 
the loan in China.230  The Chinese company runs into financial 
difficulties, and commences a bankruptcy case in China.  The bank 
exercises its rights and moves against the collateral in the United 
States.  The Chinese company responds by filing an application under 
Chapter 15 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the foreign 
main proceeding in China.  The bank argues that it would violate 
American public policy if it were forced to pursue its claim in a 
Chinese court due to the inaccessibility of the forum, and the 
primitive and unreliable state of the Chinese judicial system. 
Hypothetical 2:  The Chinese manufacturer seeks to expand into 
the United States, and wants to open a distribution center in 
California.  It identifies a parcel of land and a warehouse in Long 
Beach, and contacts a local bank to arrange mortgage financing to 
purchase the property.  The loan is negotiated and closed in 
 
Hypothetically, what if creditors were not permitted to look beyond the corporate form in the 
presence of insider abuse and seek recovery from insider assets?  Would this violate public 
policy? 
 230. This illustration is purely hypothetical in that this article does not purport to describe 
or demonstrate knowledge of actual lending practices in China and the restrictions, if any, faced 
by U.S. lenders in that market. 
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California.  The Chinese company runs into financial difficulties, and 
commences a bankruptcy case in China.  The bank exercises its rights 
and commences foreclosure proceedings against the property.  The 
Chinese company responds by filing an application under Chapter 15 
in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the foreign main 
proceeding in China.  The bank argues that it would violate American 
public policy if it were forced to pursue its claim in a Chinese court 
due to the inaccessibility of the forum, and the primitive and 
unreliable state of the Chinese judicial system. 
The bank has a strong argument in Hypothetical 2 because the 
public policy argument of the lender in Hypothetical 1 is much 
weaker.  There would probably be little sympathy if this lender were 
forced to seek repayment in China.  Again, the application of a multi-
factor test would assist the analysis for both hypotheticals.  In either 
event, it seems unfair to apply a one-dimensional test to both lenders 
based on the manufacturer’s center of main interest.  Any test that 
would mechanically force both lenders into a Chinese court should be 
questioned.231 
In sum, a Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test provides a 
framework to guide a public policy analysis.  If the test points to the 
 
 231. It should be noted that the usefulness of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis test may 
depend on the presence of a genuine and well-founded public policy objection.  To illustrate, 
suppose Hypothetical 2 were redrawn as follows: A Canadian manufacturer based in Toronto 
seeks to expand into the United States, and wants to open a distribution center in Buffalo, New 
York (a distance of about one hundred miles).  It identifies a parcel of land and a warehouse in 
Buffalo, and contacts a local bank to arrange mortgage financing to purchase the property.  The 
loan is negotiated and closed in Buffalo.  The Canadian company runs into financial difficulties, 
and commences a bankruptcy case in Toronto.  The bank exercises its rights and commences 
foreclosure proceedings against the property.  The Canadian company responds by filing an 
application under Chapter 15 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the foreign main 
proceeding in Canada.  The bank argues that it would violate American public policy if it were 
forced to enforce its rights in a Canadian court.  Under these facts, it is unlikely that a public 
policy objection would carry much weight.  Thus, despite the overwhelming connection to 
Buffalo, it is highly likely that an American court would require the New York lender to pursue 
its claims in Toronto.  A reader might, at this point, argue that the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis 
test serves no purpose because all that matters is the initial determination as to whether public 
policy is violated (to be sure, this article does not address or attempt to define the issue 
regarding the nature and scope of the public policy exception).  However, questions of public 
policy are rarely so black and white as to present an easy case, and the Lauritzen-Romero-
Rhoditis test can assist and inform the analysis.  Referring back to Hypothetical 1, for example, 
even though the lender might have a strong argument regarding the unfairness of and absence 
of due process in the Chinese courts, the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis test could be used by the 
Chinese debtor to point to the matter being heard in China and governed by Chinese law.  This 
demonstrates the flexibility of the test, as opposed to the rigid “law of the flag” test.  Its value 
lies in the fact that it takes the factual context into account in pointing to the appropriate forum 
and law.  It works without a pre-determined agenda to always favor the foreign forum. 
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United States as the proper forum, it would lend weight to, and 
perhaps even be dispositive of, a public policy challenge objecting to 
the application of foreign law.  If the test points to another country as 
the proper forum, that would suggest that American public policy 
might not be violated if the Chapter 15 case were administered 
elsewhere.  A crucial point is that it retains flexibility and permits a 
court to take into account the needs and circumstances of each case, 
as opposed to a clumsy, mechanical attempt to force every case into 
the same mold.232 
 
 232. The ever-present problem with a system like universalism is that it must necessarily 
ignore the unique aspects of each case.  However, facts do not present themselves in a 
predictable, cookie-cutter fashion.  In a case from England, the court was asked to defer to a 
bankruptcy case in the United States.  Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. United States Lines, 
Inc., [1989] Q.B. 360, 363.  However, the English court took note of the particular facts of the 
local situation to maintain English control over the English portion of the case.  Id. at 389.  This 
is how courts act in the absence of universalist restrictions.  Felixstowe arose out of the 
American bankruptcy of United States Lines, Inc. (USL).  Id. at 365.  Prior to its bankruptcy, 
USL was engaged in a worldwide shipping business.  Id.  It was incorporated in Delaware, had 
its headquarters in New Jersey, and operated in England with an address in Knightsbridge and a 
local office in Felixstowe.  Id.  Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. (FDR) was “a statutory body 
responsible for the operations of the dock and railway at Felixstowe.”  Id. at 366.  USL owed 
FDR more than £367,000 arising out of USL’s use of berthing and dock facilities and for unpaid 
stevedoring and wharfage services.  Id.  Freightliners Ltd. (FL) was a London-based container 
company that was owed more than £236,000 by USL for unpaid provisions, maintenance and 
inspection of containers.  Id.  Europe Container Terminus (B.V.) (ECT) was a Dutch company, 
id. at 363, that was owed more than £1.69 million by USL for unpaid stevedoring facilities.  Id. at 
366.  FDR, FL, and ECT applied for and were granted Mareva injunctions by a British court.  
Id. at 363.  These injunctions restrained USL from removing its English assets from the United 
Kingdom, so that such assets would be preserved for the unpaid creditors.  Id.  USL made its 
own application in the British court to set aside the injunctions.  Id.  It argued that, on the 
grounds of international comity, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court should have exclusive jurisdiction 
over USL’s assets.  Id.  It also argued that the injunctions interfered with the administration of 
the Chapter 11 case by, among other things, giving a preference to the unsecured creditors in 
the United Kingdom over the unsecured creditors elsewhere.  Id.  The court denied USL’s 
application and kept the injunctions in force.  Id. at 389.  In denying the application, the court 
noted an important fact: the result of USL’s proposed reorganization would be to limit its 
operations to North America and discontinue its operations in the rest of the world: 
No doubt this will be of great benefit both to U.S.L. themselves, and also to their 
North American creditors, who may well both be able to recover their debts or at least 
a substantial dividend thereon, and also, if the scheme succeeds continue their 
commercial relationship with U.S.L. as hitherto.  . . . 
But the position of the plaintiffs is entirely different.  They are English creditors whose 
business is based here and does not extend at all to North America; it follows that, in 
view of the intended withdrawal of U.S.L. from Europe, there could be no possible 
benefit to them in seeing the Mareva funds repatriated to the United States, and 
ploughed into U.S.L.’s general funds being used in the above manner in the effort to 
keep U.S.L. afloat as a going concern. 
Id. at 386.  The court further observed: 
Moreover, whereas the retention of the Mareva funds here will give the plaintiffs and 
their fellow European creditors security for a worthwhile percentage of their debts, 
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CONCLUSION 
The appeal of universalism lies in its simplicity and predictability.  
The law of the home country is an easy test to apply, and cuts through 
all the thorny issues raised by competing laws and policies.  To its 
supporters, its simplicity provides an elegant solution to transnational 
bankruptcies.  To be sure, simplicity can be a sign of elegance.  On 
the other hand, simplicity can be the result of naïveté—in this 
instance, the notion that conflicts generated by international 
commerce can be resolved by a one-dimensional test agreed upon by 
a group of the international, technocratic elite.  The line of maritime 
cases and the efforts of the UNCITRAL working group both address 
a common problem—what legal test should be applied to determine 
the applicable law in a world where businesses operate globally?  The 
maritime decisions are the result of cases and controversies arising 
between adversarial parties acting in furtherance of their own 
commercial interests, decided by judges with a duty to uphold the 
law.  The Model Law and Chapter 15 were generated by highly 
skilled technocrats, representing no particular commercial interest, 
engaged in discussions removed from the distractions of day-to-day 
business concerns and challenges.233  The judicial process and the 
 
this same fund, if transferred to the United States, will be a mere drop in the ocean of 
the total assets, and therefore no more than the slimmest marginal benefit to U.S.L. 
and the United States creditors. 
Id. at 387.  This case demonstrates the nature and circumstances of the principled justifications 
for protection of local creditors.  The court did not simply resort to atavistic nationalism to 
protect the local creditors.  There were principled reasons based on the facts to support the 
decision.  Id. at 389.  Just as this case presented a compelling and unique set of facts to support 
the protection of local creditors, the next transnational insolvency proceeding will present its 
own set.  Yet, the supporters of universalism wish to sweep all such reasons aside. 
 233. The peculiar nature of international organizations and agendas driven by the 
technocratic elite has drawn the attention of other commentators: 
Much distinguishes these organizations, which have their own histories, cultures and 
agendas, but what is of particular interest are the common elements of their lawmaking 
process.  At their heart is an interplay between an ad hoc task force consisting of 
academics and practitioners with great substantive command of the subject under 
consideration, and a broader body of lawyers, typically well-seasoned and 
distinguished, whose approval is necessary before the group will embrace a task force 
proposal as its own.  Membership in the task force tends to be stable but not 
overlapping, while the broader group has a less stable membership but a broader range 
of lawmaking authority.  The members of both bodies, the task forces and the broader 
group, bring their own preferences and interests but do not belong to parties or 
coalitions that can impose discipline and develop collective programs.  Even in those 
organizations where the members in the larger body have some sort of official status as 
representatives of their nations, such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT and the Hague 
Conference, rarely do national governments impose substantial political constraints on 
their emissary.  Rather, the technical nature of the subject matter ensures the relative 
obscurity of the process. 
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technocrats have generated two completely different solutions to the 
common problem.  Which is better? 
It is easy to see the justifications that the members of the 
Working Group would advance in defense of their efforts.  The fact 
that they did not represent any particular commercial interest should 
actually be viewed as a benefit, they would argue, because the process 
was free of financial self-dealing.234  By being independent, they were 
able to focus on the needs of all parties and the entire process and 
framework, and were not pushing selfish interests without regard to 
the effect on the whole. 
Despite these justifications, it seems fair to question the merits 
and results of a process that operates in a vacuum, where the goal is 
to create and preserve a pristine forum unsullied by the grit and grime 
of commerce.235  The process by which the Model Law was developed 
 
What these bodies seem to represent, in other words, is a fairly complete realization of 
the technocratic ideal of lawmaking.  Each nation’s leading specialists convene to draft 
an instrument that ought to embody the best rules that they can devise for 
international commerce.  National politicians participate only indirectly, mostly by 
retaining the final say over accepting the completed instrument.  The technical experts 
have a relatively free hand to discover the common ground that can transcend 
differences in culture, history, levels of economic development, and social structure.  
Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial 
Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 755-56 (1999).  Moreover, the members of the Working Group “do 
not formally represent organized interests, although they may have some affinity or professional 
ties with particular groups.”  Id. at 758. 
 234. However, there is a contrary view to this assertion: 
The official commentary notes that bankruptcy practitioners, both in the private bar 
and the judiciary, had an important role in developing the [Model] Law, during the 
drafting process and through an international meeting held to review the Working 
Group’s draft.  The expansion of discretionary authority of bankruptcy tribunals 
doubtlessly appealed to this group.  Judges would have more power, thereby 
enhancing the prestige and satisfaction of their work.  Lawyers who specialized in the 
field could charge more for their skills as a result of the more challenging 
legal environment. 
Id. at 786-87. 
 235. Plus, a one-factor, bright line test invites manipulation and gamesmanship.  Professor 
LoPucki has written extensively on the incentives to engage in manipulation of the home 
country standard, and the ease with which the home country can be shifted by a debtor acting in 
anticipation of bankruptcy.  See, e.g., LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra 
note 56; LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 31; LoPucki, Global and 
Out of Control, supra note 25; LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 27.  Just like the 
vessel owner shopping for a more relaxed regulatory standard in order to escape the burdens of 
its home country, a strategic debtor can alter the “center of its main interests” to select the 
desired bankruptcy law.  Indeed, it is out of this discussion regarding forum shopping that the 
comparison between multinational debtors and vessels flying a flag of convenience was drawn.  
The attractions and drawbacks of a bright line test arise out of a fundamental tension in any 
legal system: 
In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two social needs: the need 
for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private 
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stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s maritime cases, which 
were decided under the “case or controversy” requirement of the 
Constitution.236  Through a system where actual conflicts and 
competing interests are heard and resolved, a distinct line of 
reasoning and analysis over a span of centuries has repeatedly 
rejected the simplicity of the law of the flag as the controlling test.  
The multi-dimensional analysis of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis 
trilogy may be messy, difficult to apply, and lacking in ex ante 
predictability.  Nevertheless, this test, and rulings such as Spector and 
Cunard, represent the accumulated experience of the Supreme Court, 
and international bankruptcy theory may find guidance from that 
experience. 
 
individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social 
issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official choice, 
issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete 
case.  In some legal systems at some periods it may be that too much is sacrificed to 
certainty, and that judicial interpretation of statutes or of precedent is too formal and 
so fails to respond to the similarities and differences between cases which are visible 
only when they are considered in the light of social aims.  In other systems or at other 
periods it may seem that too much is treated by courts as perennially open or revisable 
in precedents, and too little respect paid to such limits as legislative language, despite 
its open texture, does after all provide. 
HART, supra note 28, at 130. 
 236. The “case or controversy” requirement is one of the bedrock principles underlying 
litigation in the federal courts: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between 
two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.  The reason for the “case or controversy requirement” is clear and well 
settled: 
[I]t is quite clear that “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of 
justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.”  Thus, the 
implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against 
advisory opinions on federal courts.  . . .  [T]he rule against advisory opinions also 
recognizes that such suits often “are not pressed before the Court with that clear 
concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for 
decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted 
situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.” 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (citation omitted). 
